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**MILITARY INTERVENTION
IN
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA**

by

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This thesis argues that the violence associated with civil conflict in Africa is part of the process of central state power accumulation -- a process which in Europe took place in the 17th and 18th centuries. By attempting to reestablish order and stability, the United States only disrupts and prevents the consolidation of state authroity necessary for the emergence of national states and long-term stability. The thesis concludes that international military intervention cannot solve the root cause of the instability and that, therefore, external actors should refrain from intervening in these situations.

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MILITARY INTERVENTION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

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Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this thesis is to examine United States military intervention in the civil wars of sub-Saharan Africa. Because the United States does not have any strategic interests in the region, it becomes involved in African conflicts only when they reach extreme levels of violence and when states collapse. This level of violence generates a degree of international sympathy that puts pressure on the United States government to intervene militarily in the domestic policies and political arrangements of these countries in order to stop the violence and restore order.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The purpose of this thesis is to examine United States military intervention in the civil wars of sub-Saharan Africa. United States intervention takes place in the peculiar context of the African development process. Europe underwent a similar development process in the 17th and 18th centuries, in which it "developed, expanded, made war, gained victories, and consolidated – or suffered defeats, shrunk, failed to consolidate, and disappeared – in an international context of moderated but violent disorder." (Lustick, 1995, p. 4) Today, externally enforced international norms heavily influence (if not dictate) what a state's borders will be and, although occasionally and indirectly, who its head of state will be.

The civil wars in African countries are by and large over who has the right and ability to make the rules that govern society (just as the wars in Europe 300 years ago). Centralized authority has not been consolidated within African state apparatuses, and numerous factions within each state continue to vie for that power. The violence and conflict that is ongoing within these states has historically been present in almost all countries undergoing the process of primitive central state power accumulation (Cohen, Brown and Organski, 1981, p. 902).

Sub-Saharan Africa is at the very beginning of this process. Europe, the United States and much of Asia and Latin America have already gone through this lengthy and violent transformation. Because the process is occurring in the late 20th century, in the context of international norms and media that did not exist 300 years ago, there is the tendency for the international community to refuse to stand by "idly" and witness the violence that accompanies the instability and insecurity of these regions, and so demand

their governments do something about it. This pressure occasionally results in an external military force intervening in order to stop the violence.

Such intervention, I argue, only disrupts and prevents the consolidation of state authority which is necessary for the emergence of national states and long-term stability. Up until 1989, when an external force, such as the United States, had the military power and political will to intervene in the political development of another country, it did so to protect its own interests. Puppet regimes were put in place to further the interests of the external patron, not for internal development. But the end of the Cold War inspired a surge of optimism regarding the future of international politics. No longer harnessed into a battle of the superpowers with the Soviet Union, the United States is "free" to "do the right thing" and fix all the ills of the world by enforcing a constitutional government, free-market economies, and respect for human rights in regions that do not uphold these same principles upon which Western democracies are structured. But in reality, when the United States does not perceive any strong security interests at stake in the region requiring intervention, the operation quickly looses public support and American forces are pulled out but not before a considerable amount of damage has already been done. In the end, regardless if U.S. interests are present or not, the process of consolidating centralized authority within that African state is set back.

The road to international military intervention in sub-Saharan Africa is paved with good intentions. Unfortunately the attempt to implement a quick, cheap fix – to remedy instability in the short-term – may be an obstacle to long-term stability. This disrupts state consolidation because intervention can never be impartial. Historically, whoever is selected to be in charge is generally just a client of U.S. patronage. The necessary

economic and political stability never occurs because the regime is dependent on external patronage, not internal legitimacy. The bottom line is this: Since international military intervention cannot solve the root cause of the instability within its resource and interest constraints, external actors should refrain from intervening in these situations.

The issues to be addressed are divided into five chapters. The first chapter will focus on the concepts and definitions which form the foundation of the thesis. Specifically they are:

- What is a state, national state, nation-state?
- What is a collapsed state?
- What is military intervention?
- What is the definition of sub-Saharan Africa?

Chapter II will focus on the existing theory and process of state-building. This chapter will show how European states were formed and also how current Third World countries are developing into national states. Chapter III will provide a general outline of the region in order to understand why foreign military intervention occurs there in the first place. Chapter IV will examine military intervention. Specific questions to be explored in this chapter include:

- What are the United States' security interests in sub-Saharan Africa?
- Why does the United States intervene in foreign civil wars?
- How does the United States intervene; what are the goals of intervention?

Finally, Chapter V will tie the preceding chapters together by means of a case study. This chapter will analyze the civil war and subsequent military intervention in Somalia. The results of the United States military intervention will also be analyzed in terms of both the effect it had on the international community and on Somalia.

I. INTRODUCTION

A. OBJECTIVE

The purpose of this thesis is to examine United States military intervention in the civil wars of sub-Saharan Africa. U.S. intervention takes place in the peculiar context of the African development process. This is peculiar because when Europe was undergoing its development process in the 17th and 18th centuries, it "developed, expanded, made war, gained victories, and consolidated – or suffered defeats, shrunk, failed to consolidate, and disappeared – in an international context of moderated but violent disorder." (Lustick, unpublished paper, p. 4) Today, there are externally enforced norms that heavily influence (if not dictate) what a state's borders will be and who will be its ruler.

The civil wars in African states occur because by and large, just like Europe 300 years ago, African society cannot decide who has the right and ability to make the rules. Centralized authority has not been consolidated within the state apparatus, thus causing numerous factions within each state to vie for that power. The violence and conflict that is ongoing within these states has historically been present in almost all countries undergoing the process of primitive central state power accumulation (Cohen, Brown and Organski, 1981, p. 902).

Sub-Saharan Africa is at the very beginning of this process. Europe, the United States and much of Asia and Latin America have already gone through this lengthy and violent transformation. Because the process is occurring in the late 20th century in the context of international norms and media that did not exist 300 years ago, there is the tendency for the international community to refuse to stand by "idly" and witness the violence that accompanies the instability and insecurity of these regions and demand their

governments do something about it. This pressure occasionally results in an external military force intervening in order to stop the violence. The United States and United Nations actions in Somalia in the early 1990s as well as the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group's (ECOMOG) current involvement in Liberia are two examples.

Such intervention, I argue, only disrupts and prevents the consolidation of state authority which is necessary for the emergence of national states and long-term stability. This is because historically, when an external force has the military power and political will to intervene in the political development of another country, it does so to protect its own interests. Puppet regimes are put in place to further the interests of the external patron, not for internal development (e.g., Zaire in the 1960s under Mobutu Sese Sekou). But when the United States does not have any interests at stake, the operation quickly loses public support and American forces are pulled out, but not before a considerable amount of damage has already been done (e.g., Somalia in the early 1990s). In the end, regardless if U.S. interests are present or not, the process of consolidating centralized authority within that African state is set back.

The road of international military intervention in sub-Saharan Africa is paved with good intentions. Unfortunately the attempt to implement a quick, cheap fix – to remedy instability in the short-term – may be an obstacle to long-term stability. It disrupts state consolidation because intervention can never be impartial. Historically, whoever is selected to be in charge is generally a client of U.S. patronage. The necessary economic and political stability never occurs because the regime is dependent on external patronage, not internal taxation. The bottom line is this: Since international military intervention

cannot solve the root cause of the instability within its resource and interest constraints, external actors should refrain from intervening in these situations.

B. OUTLINE

The questions to be addressed are divided among the remaining four chapters. Chapter II will focus on the process of state-building. This chapter will draw heavily from theories of Charles Tilly (1975, 1985, 1992), Barrington Moore (1966), Joel Migdal (1988), and A.F. Mullins (1987). Specifically, this chapter will show how European states were formed and also how current Third World countries are developing into national states.

The second chapter will be a cursory look at the region of sub-Saharan Africa in general to understand why foreign military intervention occurs there in the first place. Chapter III will provide a general outline of the region by suggesting an answer to the following questions:

- What is sub-Saharan Africa's colonial legacy?
- What are the continuing constraining factors inhibiting the political development of sub-Saharan African states?

Chapter IV will examine military intervention. Specific questions to be explored in this section include:

- What are the United States' security interests in sub-Saharan Africa?
- Why does the United States intervene in foreign civil wars?
- How does the United States intervene; what are the goals of intervention?

Finally, Chapter V will tie the preceding four chapters together by analyzing military intervention in Somalia from 1992 to 1994 to show the nature of that civil war, the criteria by which America judges successful intervention, and why the United States could not effectively intervene to solve the conflict.

This thesis has a subjective orientation. Although a more objective orientation would be ideal, statistical data on sub-Saharan Africa is either incomplete, unavailable or of questionable quality. Ken Menkhaus, after attempting field work in Somalia in the summer of 1997, concludes that, "even when on the ground, the best one can do is impressionistic data" in this type of environment (personal communication, 18 Aug 1997).

C. CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS

The remainder of this chapter will define some terms which form the foundation of the thesis. Specifically, the following questions will be addressed:

- What is a state, national state, nation-state?
- What is a collapsed state?
- Why is it a bad thing to be a collapsed state; why is being a state important in the late 1990s?
- What is military intervention?
- What is the definition of sub-Saharan Africa?

1. State

There are various conceptions of what a state is, which can generally be categorized into juridical versus empirical statehood. At the empirical end of the spectrum, Max Weber defines a state as "a human community that successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory. The state is considered the sole source of the right to use violence." (Gerth and Mills, 1958, p. 78)

A state is an organized body of relatively permanent institutions of power. It claims control over a defined territory and the people within that territory. Decisions which affect these people are made, enforced and mediated through the state apparatus. (Chazan et al., 1992, p. 39) An empirically "hard" state possesses

- Structural autonomy, whereby state institutions, leaders, and officials effectively remove themselves from the influence of societal actors and influences and are thereby able to act and make decisions independently of social forces;
- The political penetration of society, by which national leaders and governmental institutions secure clear-cut hegemony over intermediary and ground-level political actors and social units;
- The extraction of resources from the most productive economic sectors, which in the African case usually refers to peasant agriculture; and
- Ideological legitimization; that is, the promulgation of official doctrines to defend and justify the achievement of autonomy. (Forrest, July 1988, p. 423)

At the opposite end of the spectrum are the international legal scholars whose definition of statehood rests more on juridical characteristics. According to Ian Brownlie the state is:

> a legal person, recognized by international law, with the following attributes: a) a defined territory, b) a permanent population, c) an effective government, and d) independence or the right to enter into relations with other states. (Jackson and Rosberg, 1982: 3, pp. 3, 5)

This distinction is important because only the international community can recognize juridical attributes of statehood. Empirical statehood is determined by the population within the state's borders. When the majority of African states received independence in the early 1960s, their artificial borders were effectively sanctified by the Organization for African Unity and the United Nations, which served to prohibit seccessionary movements and wars of expansion. This is because the power vested in these new presidents was so fragile and they were so insecure in their position, a mutual pact of non-aggression seemed to them the safest route for their own personal and political survival. Therefore, territorial integrity was to remain consistent with colonial arbitration. (Copson, 1994, p. 175) Most sub-Saharan African countries possess juridical statehood –

their borders (defined territory) are recognized by the international community. One would be hard pressed to find an African state with a stable community or one whose executive authority is not based on personal rule. Empirically, sub-Saharan African countries have weak, or "soft," states because the central authority (if one exists) is unable "to make and implement the binding rules for all the people...in a given territory, even using force if necessary to have its way." (Migdal, 1988, p. 19)

The state-making process in Africa and the structural impediments to the creation of a hard state in that region will be discussed in Chapters II and III. It is sufficient to say for now that sub-Saharan African countries are characterized by weak states whose legitimacy lies in their juridical attributes rather than their empirical ones – recognition by the international community vice domestic capability. (Jackson and Rosberg, 1982:3, p. 21)

This definition reflects a change both of international norms and in the concept of sovereignty as conceived by the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. The political theory of sovereignty developed when Western European countries were constructing national-states. Authoritative control was invested in a central ruler who was responsible for making laws and having them enforced. The sovereign was above the law and he alone enjoyed the monopoly of force within his territory. This was how order and stability were maintained. (Deng, et al., 1996, p. 2)

As time went on groups within society learned to bargain with the state in which citizens received certain rights and privileges in exchange for resources (usually taxes) that went to the sovereign (Tilly, 1992, p. 102). This gave rise to the concept of internal sovereignty, the shift of power from the monarch to the people. This shift occurred with

the rise of national states and of the notion of democratic citizenship (Habermas, 1996, p. 286).

Throughout history, but especially since WWII as democratic states gained more power within the international community, the traditional concept of sovereignty (where it still existed) continued to erode and was replaced by "the development of democratic values and institutions and with international accountability on the basis of human rights and humanitarian standards." (Deng, et al., 1996, p. 2) The Nuremberg trials after WWII, international sanctions against apartheid in South Africa, and the various U.N. peacekeeping operations in the post-Cold War era illustrate the growing resolve of the international community (up to a certain point) to override sovereignty in support of these international norms of basic human rights (Deng, et al., 1996, pp. 6-10). Essentially, the juridical interpretation of statehood, after WWII and especially after the Cold War, is drawing closer to the empirical definition. This puts African countries in an unusual predicament because now they are becoming "stateless."

2. National States and Nation-States

The above definition of a state is in political-territorial terms. Another heated debate that revolves around state legitimacy concerns its cultural aspects; specifically, the justification of a state in terms of its nationhood. According to Walker Connor:

> The word *nation* comes from the Latin and, when first coined, clearly conveyed the idea of common blood ties. It was derived from the past participle of the verb *nasci*, meaning to be born. And hence, the Latin noun, *nationem*, connoting *breed* or *race*. Thus, at some medieval universities, a student's *nationem* designated the sector of the country from whence he came. But when introduced into the English language in the late thirteenth century, it was with its primary connotation of a blood related group. (Connor, 1994, p. 38)

Just as with the term "nation," the original meaning of "ethnicity" became distorted due to the rise of capitalism and the formation of states. Over the past 400 years war and technology have facilitated the cultural homogenization of large groups of people within the confines of a state. Enforcing the same laws, behavior, language, etc. on everyone within the territory was a deliberate "project" taken on by the state. Intermarriage, immigration and assimilation make the concept of blood ties obsolete, given the size of today's countries. How far back in one's family tree does one need to go to prove his/her blood is pure? In today's society, it is therefore more useful and logical to use the term's "distorted" definition; that is, a nation in the twentieth century can be described as a group of people with "a commitment to a political project." (Hutchinson and Smith, 1994, p. 15)

Charles Tilly, clearly described a difference between "national states" and "nation-states." A national state "controls a well-defined, continuous territory; is relatively centralized; is differentiated from other organizations, and reinforces its claim through a tendency to acquire a monopoly over the concentrated means of physical coercion within its territory." (Tilly, 1975, p. 27) On the other hand, a nation-state is a "state whose people share a strong linguistic, religious, and symbolic identity." (Tilly, 1992, p. 3)

Historically, in almost all cases in Europe, national states were formed before nation-states. Benedict Anderson makes a persuasive claim in his Imagined Communities (1988) that states created nations everywhere. The force that transformed national states into nation-states was nationalism, the most common ideology of state-builders, which did not become prevalent until the late 1700s, first in North America and Western Europe and later in Latin America. (Hutchinson and Smith, 1994, p. 5)

> National states that have performed successfully over a long period of time and have, therefore, knit their people together in terms of historical memories, legal codes, language, religion, and similar factors may evolve into *nation*-states, but they are not synonymous with *nation*-states. Furthermore, historically, national states predate the emergence of *nation*-states; they are the products of the state-making enterprise rather than of nationalism or nation building. (Ayoob, 1995, p. 24)

These terms are defined up front because it is important to realize that very few states if any, can be classified as *nation*-states. According to a 1971 survey of 132 entities only 12 could legitimately claim to be *nation*-states (Connor, as cited in Hutchinson & Smith, 1994, p. 39). A true *nation*-state is the end product of hundreds of years of cultural homogenization (Tilly, 1992, pp. 115-116). Massimo d'Azeglio captured this reality when he stated at the first meeting of the Italian parliament, "We have made Italy, now we must make Italians." (Ayoob, 1995, p. 25)

The boundaries of Africa were determined at a conference table in Europe in 1885. The European powers partitioned Africa with little regard to existing cultural groups or political systems (Diamond, 1988b, p. 6). Contrary to stereotypical beliefs, sub-Saharan Africa was not totally a continent of small tribes hunting and gathering for their subsistence. There were a few instances of national states in the process of development prior to colonization. These were strongly structured political entities headed by an ambitious chieftain with a well-trained army and hand-picked aristocracy that extended his governance over a vast area. A few examples of these emerging national states include the Ashanti (of present day Ghana), Abbyssinia (Ethiopia) and the Zulu (of South Africa). [see Fig 1.1] These were also the areas that gave the colonists the most resistance. (Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1988, p. 67) These emerging national states formed in a manner similar to those in Western Europe – "to meet the needs of trade and



Fig 1.1. Precolonial Africa, Eighteenth to Nineteenth Century (Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1988, p. 69)

the problems of defense." (Curtin, et al., 1995, p. 73) They waged war on their neighbors and usually won because they, the Asante and Zulu especially, developed war-fighting tactics and weapons superior to those of their adversaries. These budding national states then absorbed the conquered people as part of their own possession; demanding taxes or conscripts, and providing protection. Colonialism stopped this process. The Europeans suppressed Africans from warring against each other so as to instill some type of order to enable them to carry out their imperialist aims of extracting resources. The European militaries were also much too powerful for the African forces as the Zulu and Asante wars against the British have shown.

This situation of proto-national states was rare, however. "Most states had been formed recently, upon shaky social and cultural foundations; had themselves gained power through conquest; and ruled over peoples who had been subjected for less than a century, some for only one or two generations." (Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1988, p. 67) Stateless societies, where authority over a community was dispersed, limited, temporary, or non-existent, such as that of the pre-colonial Ibo (present day southeast Nigeria) still constituted a majority of Africa in 1885. (Curtin, et al., 1995, p. 71)

3. Collapsed State

State collapse is a "situation where the structure, legitimate power, law, and political order have fallen apart." (Zartman, 1995, p.1) This breakdown in governance, law, and order also means that the security and well being of the state's citizens are not ensured (Zartman, 1995, p. 5). A power vacuum is created where civil society is so weak it cannot form an alternative government to replace a fallen one. Somalia, Liberia and Yugoslavia are the most clear-cut examples of fallen states.

A state collapses because it can no longer perform the necessary functions that define a state. This means it is no longer a) the accepted source of identity or sovereign authority, b) able to make and enforce decisions that apply to people within its territories, and c) guarantee security for its population. It has lost its legitimacy, and therefore the power vested in those who run the state is up for grabs. (Zartman, 1995, p. 5) State collapse is a clear example of how the international community, through juridical recognition has legitimized states which have no empirical basis. However, as mentioned in section C1 of this chapter, the international community is shifting its paradigm and the juridical and empirical interpretations of statehood are drawing closer to one another. The rather quick recognition by the international community of Bosnia and Eritrea in the early 1990s shows this shift.[1]

Charles Tilly described state-making in Western Europe as a result of three processes: war-making, extraction, and protection. The state extracted resources (taxes) from its population to support an army and wage war on other territories in order to access and accumulate more capital. As war-maker and extractor, the state also enjoyed a monopoly on legitimate large-scale violence. Therefore the government also became protector (by default). Banditry, piracy, gangland rivalry and racketeering were the norm in the 16th and 17th centuries. It was in the state's best interest to eliminate or neutralize these enemies of the state-makers' clients since these merchants, banking families, and even peasants were the sources of the state's resources. The merchants and banking families

[1] Somaliland has also sought diplomatic recognition which as of this writing, it has not yet received. The Somaliland Republic declared independence from Somalia on 18 May 1991. It has adopted a constitution, elected a national assembly and a head of state, and issued currency, stamps and passports. (Obtained via the Internet at http://www.anaserve.com/~mbali/web.htm on 4 Nov 97).

provided the capital which princes used to raise an army and wage war. The peasants were needed to grow food to feed the urban population and the army. It was a mutually beneficial arrangement, satisfying the needs of both society and state (Tilly, 1985, pp. 172-182). Chapter II will go into much greater detail on Tilly's theory of state-formation.

But in a collapsed state, this mutually beneficial agreement of extraction and protection does not exist. "The state no longer receives support from nor exercises control over its people, and it no longer is even the target of demands, because its people know that it is incapable of providing supplies." (Zartman, 1995, p. 5) This is particularly evident in Africa. As mentioned earlier, territorial integrity based on colonial borders remains, with very few exceptions intact.[2] These borders were guaranteed in Article III of the Organization of African Unity's charter. (Copson, 1994, p. 175) War making to expand or change these borders has been rare. This is because the new leaders of newly-independent African states were politically insecure for various reasons, such as their countries' "deep ethnic divisions, a very shallow sense of nationhood, thinly established political institutions with little depth of experience, extreme economic dependence, and revolutionary popular expectations generated by the independence struggle." (Diamond, 1988b, p. 5) As the founders of the Organization of African Unity's charter, they understood that it was in their own mutual self-interest, for political and personal survival, to leave the borders as is. In the post-Cold War era, this situation is beginning to change for two reasons. First, with no more rivalry between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., Africa is

[2] Eritrea was finally granted independence from Ethiopia in 1991. The recent effort of Somaliland to succeed and reestablish the colonial borders is another confusing example. Other exceptions include the failed secessionary movements of Biafra from Nigeria in 1967, and the Katanga region from Zaire in 1963. Somalia did go to war with Ethiopia over the Ogaden region in 1977 and lost.

no longer being used as a proxy battlefield in the East-West conflict. Developed countries are increasingly marginalizing sub-Saharan African states. Second, African societies are becoming stronger, better educated, and more willing to take on these challenges of state-building on their own rather than rely solely on external patronage.

States do not collapse overnight but gradually slide down a slippery slope; some recover, some cannot. "Collapse is an extreme case of governance problems" (Zartman, 1995, p. 8). In Africa this has taken the form of a regime (often filled by independence-generation civilians who have been in power for a long time) that simply cannot meet the demands imposed on it by society. Resources dry up either from a lack of foreign aid, an inability of the state to efficiently extract it from society, or simply from corruption and internal waste. Various social and ethnic groups that have been marginalized or even persecuted since independence begin to demand their fair share. These regimes, which rarely had internal legitimacy outside the capital city anyway, begin to lose external legitimacy. The state then implodes; a power vacuum is created leaving civil society to pick up the pieces if it can. (Zartman, 1995, p. 8) When it cannot, anarchy reigns and the international community is often summoned to reestablish order and stability.

4. Military Intervention

Although the United States intervenes in Africa politically and economically as well as militarily, this thesis will focus only on the effects of military intervention as defined here. Traditionally, intervention means "the use of military force by one country to interfere in the internal affairs of another country." (Schraeder, 1992a, p. 2) In the 1990s, intervention takes on a meaning well beyond the notion of classic peacekeeping developed by Dag Hammerskoldj in 1956 with the dispatch of the United Nations

Emergency Force (UNEF) to the Sinai peninsula (Durch, 1993, p. 7). The biggest difference between classic peacekeeping and 1990s peacekeeping is that during the Cold War, there was inter-state conflict. Now the warring factions are within the same state. The following is a list of the various terms and definitions of peace operations[3] and an example of each (Durch, 1993, pp. 8-10, 17):

- **Peacemaking** generally means using mediation, conciliation, arbitration, or diplomatic initiatives to resolve a conflict; United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) in West New Guinea, 1962-63.

- **Peacekeeping** traditionally involves using military personnel under restricted rules of engagement as monitors once a cease-fire has been negotiated; United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission, 1991.

- **Peace-enforcing** refers to using military force to complete a cessation of hostilities or to terminate acts of aggression; United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) in Yugoslav Conflict, 1991, and Somali Civil War, 1991, respectively.

- **Peace-building** involves rebuilding institutions and infrastructure within a country to create conditions conducive to peace; intervention into the Korean civil war in 1950.

- **Protective engagement** means using essentially defensive military measures to provide safe havens or a secure environment for humanitarian operations. Unified Task Force, 9 Dec 92 - 4 May 93. This is better known as the U.S. Operation Restore Hope in Somalia.

During the Cold War, when the United States intervened in Africa militarily, it did so when its strategic interests seemed to be at stake – to stop the spread of communism. In the post-Cold War era, the United States has few strategic interests in sub-Saharan

[3] Definitions for United Nations peace operations were taken from the University of Michigan's Documents Center for Africa homepage under "Contemporary Conflicts in Africa" at http://www.lib.umich.edu/libhome/Documents.center/forafr.html

Africa, and so justification for its military intervention has been based on upholding international norms of human rights (Finnemore, 1996, p. 154). Therefore, some political and international legal scholars, such as Anthony Clark Arend and Robert J. Beck, have differentiated between military intervention and humanitarian intervention:

- **Military intervention** is the deployment of military forces by a foreign power or powers for the purpose of controlling domestic policies or political arrangements in the target state in ways that clearly violate sovereignty. (Finnemore, 1996, p. 154, fn. 2)

- **Humanitarian intervention** is military intervention with the goal of protecting the lives and welfare of foreign citizens. (Finnemore, p. 154, fn. 2)

However, when humanitarian intervention takes place in the context of civil war, as it does in Africa, the distinction is not particularly useful. Whatever justification a country wishes to use, humanitarian or political, once soldiers are used to feed and protect civilians, a political stigma is immediately attached to the actual humanitarian mission (Stedman, 1995, pp. 48-49, 51).

5. Definition of Sub-Saharan Africa

For our purposes, sub-Saharan Africa consists of the forty-five African states that lie between the Sahara Desert and South Africa, including the island states of Madagascar, Mauritius, Comoros, Seychelles, Cape Verde, Sao Tome and Principe, and Equatorial Guinea (see Fig 1.2). African countries that are not included in this group are, to the north, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco, and to the south, South Africa. Sub-Saharan African countries share similar economic, social, and political problems, which do not exist to the same degree in North African countries or in South Africa.



Fig 1.2. Sub-Saharan Africa
(World Bank, 1989)

a. South Africa

South Africa is excluded from the following discussion because although it has numerous problems, it does not share the same economic, social or political situation of the rest of sub-Saharan Africa. South Africa has an industrialized economy with a per capita GDP in 1995 of $3160. The average for the rest of sub-Saharan Africa is about $300. The South African state, despite the fact that the apartheid regime never enjoyed full internal legitimacy, is relatively strong; it is able to make decisions and enforce law and order throughout the country.

Socially, South Africa is distinct because its population had been ruled by a white minority for at least 300 years. This historical legacy is what really sets South Africa apart from the rest of sub-Saharan Africa. Although the Portuguese had first come to the African coast in the 15th century, it was not until the mid-1600s, at Cape Town, that European settlers actually established a colony and began penetrating the interior. These Dutch settlers established farms and sold their agricultural goods[4] to the traversing European merchant vessels on their way to and from India. They invested in South Africa because it was their new home; they were there to stay. The rest of Africa did not experience European settlement this early and to such a degree, if at all. The arrival of these Dutch settlers (known as Afrikaners) brought about the sharp and sudden dislocation of the Africans' only known way of life, which in turn enabled South Africa to modernize much faster than the rest of the continent.

[4] The commercialization of agriculture is one of the key building blocks to the state formation process as will be shown in Chapter II.

b. North Africa

The Sahara Desert serves as a major division between the northern African countries and the rest of the continent. This vast sea of sand divides the people of the continent just as effectively as a body of water. Although the Sahara is penetrable, it has been a hindrance to the spread of religion, trade, science, and culture throughout history. North Africa had the benefit of more constant interaction with people from the Iberian and Arabian peninsulas. The Ottoman empire and the spread of Islam greatly increased the homogenization of the people of North Africa which had an overall positive effect on the social and political stability of the region. Although Arab merchants did cross the Sahara into West Africa, bringing trade and religion, this penetration was not far enough or frequent enough to serve in a homogenizing capacity for states below about twelve degrees north latitude.

D. CONCLUSION

This thesis explores the effectiveness of international military intervention in collapsed or collapsing states. It argues that such efforts to shore up stability in the short term tend to undermine the process of state formation and thereby act as obstacles to sustainable long-term stability. The root cause of the instability still exists and cannot be solved through external military force.

Sub-Saharan African states are weak. They generally lack a centralized authority that can penetrate society and enforce laws within their artificially defined territory. Some of these states are in the process of state-building (Nigeria and Uganda, for example); some are in the process of state collapse (such as Somalia and Liberia). These two processes are often indistinguishable until many years after the fact: both are saturated

with violence and repression. However, the violence involved in state-building is constructive and the violence involved in state collapse, although destructive in the short term is actually good in the long term because it is destroying the remnants of the traditional structures in society that are inhibiting the consolidation of central authority.[5]

The goal of external military intervention is to stop the violence and restore the status quo. But it merely serves to uphold traditional structures and to keep these African states weak. During the Cold War, the United States intervened in Africa because it perceived its strategic interests were at stake. It therefore installed pro-Western puppet regimes so as to maintain the balance of power in the region. These regimes, which became bloated and corrupt off external patronage, were accountable to the U.S. (or conversely, U.S.S.R) and rarely directed their energies toward their own empirical political legitimacy or economic development. In the 1990s however, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was no power to balance in Africa. The United States becomes pressured by the international community and its own domestic constituencies to restore order in Africa because many statesmen have decided that, as the sole remaining hegemon, it is the moral obligation of the U.S. to promote democracy and stability around the world (Hoffman, winter 1995-96, p. 49). The upshot, however, is that the traditional structures of these African societies remain intact, preventing the consolidation of central authorities.

The world in general (and the United States in particular) needs to overcome its obsession with maintaining stability in sub-Saharan Africa. As shown by the numerous

[5] My attribution of "goodness" to the long-term consequences of the violence in state-building may appear to be a bold assertion. Nevertheless, it has been substantiated by numerous sociologists and political scientists. Specifically, I am referring to the works of Charles Tilly (1992), Joel S. Migdal (1988), Barrington Moore (1966) and Youssef Cohen, Brian R. Brown, and A.F.K. Organski (1981). This literature will be cited extensively in the next chapter and can be found in the List of References at the end of this thesis.

civil wars and acts of violence in the region, the people of sub-Saharan Africa are not happy with the status quo and wish to change it. The international community needs to step aside and allow African societies the breathing room the set up institutions suitable for their own growth and development. For when it comes to sub-Saharan Africa, when the international community decides to "help," it inevitably manages to prevent any long-term sustainable stability.

II. EXISTING THEORY

The role of violence in the process of state making has been analyzed by numerous scholars. An exhaustive analysis is that of Charles Tilly, whose works include The Formation of National States in Western Europe (1975), "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime," (1985), and Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990-1992 (1992). His work looks at the various processes, sequences of events, and relationships between government and society that allowed national states to form. An explanation of his interpretation will be the basis of the first half of this chapter.

The second half of this chapter will look specifically at state-making in the Third World. The bulk of this section will revolve primarily around the theory articulated in Joel S. Migdal's Strong Societies and Weak States (1988). Additional material will also be drawn specifically from Thomas M. Callaghy's The State-Society Struggle: Zaire in Comparative Perspective (1984).

These two state-making experiences are treated separately because, although the European model forms the basic, general theory, today's Third World states are confronted by numerous pressures that did not burden the Europeans of the 17th century. This "accumulation of crises" in Africa is brought on by such pressures as the standards and expectations of the international community (particularly concerning human rights), mass political representation, industrialization, time constraints, and extraordinary environmental constraints leading to desertification, drought, famine and disease (Ayoob, 1995, pp. 30-31). State-making is a long and violent process in its own right. These pressures tend to make it even more so by adding additional burdens.

A. EUROPEAN STATE-MAKING

Charles Tilly made it perfectly clear in his "Reflections on the History of European State-Making" (1975, p. 4) and "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime" (1985, p. 169) that the future of Third World countries cannot be foreseen by reading the cards of Europe's history. Nonetheless, a study of the European state-making experience can serve to clear up any misinterpretations of the past. The purpose here is to show that there were serious costs involved in building states. These costs were paid by the weaker and less-educated members of society such as peasants and other lower class elements. These costs included suffering, an unwilling surrender of food, labor or land, and, of course, death (Tilly, 1975, p.71). This process did not start off as the civilized "social contract" that exists in industrialized Western states today. Barrington Moore's Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (1966) argues persuasively that this nasty, brutish and long process of coercive exploitation is what brought about strong states and liberal democratic regimes. The purpose of this section is to explain how states formed in Western Europe and why the process was so violent, and what kind of violence development entails, and to ask whether violence is endemic to this process.

1. How Did They Do It?

According to Tilly, states were made through the events and processes of war, protection, and extraction. Juridical boundaries did not exist in the Europe of the 16th and 17th centuries. France was not always France as we know it today. The kings of Brittany and Burgundy and the Duke of Normandy certainly did not consider themselves French. Monarchs went to war with one another to eliminate or neutralize rivals to their authority. In this process, the stronger princes (those with the most powerful armies) were able to

expand their territories in order to reap the benefits of whatever "goods" lay in that land (fertile soil, access to waterways, etc.), or merely to create a buffer zone between the area they could secure and a potentially hostile neighbor (Tilly, 1992, pp. 70-71). Of course, intermarriage of ruling families was always a less violent means of acquiring property, but the cost of defending it still existed.

Why did monarchs go to war instead of making some "gentlemen's agreement" over access to ports, for example? "The central, tragic fact is simple: coercion works; those who apply substantial force to their fellows get compliance, and from that compliance draw the multiple advantage of money, goods, deference, and access to pleasures denied to less powerful people." (Tilly 1992, p. 70) Machiavelli told his prince not to honor his word or else he would end up losing power (Machiavelli, 1994, p. 26).

Furthermore, the international community at this time period was truly a Hobbesian world. European national states formed during the 17th and 18th centuries, when there was an "accumulation of scientific, technical, and geographic knowledge, growing populations, and rapid cultural change." (Mullins, 1987, p. 109) The European princes had to wage war on one another, both to protect his own borders and to expand his own territory, because if he did not, a more powerful prince would come along and eliminate the weaker one. This was the law of the jungle; the survival of the fittest. (Mullins, 1987, p. 111)

Waging war, however, costs money. Monarchs acquired this money in two ways. First, they formed alliances with the wealthy landlords and banking families in their domains and received loans from them. The landlords also received protection from these "war-making machines" they were helping to create. The second way the princes acquired money was through the repressive taxation of agricultural resources – namely, the

peasants. This "pressure of central government taxation pushed peasant production into the market and thereby augmented the opportunities for trade creation and economic specialization." (Tilly, 1985, p. 179)

In order to understand how war-making relates to state-making, the last paragraph needs to be dissected, since it discusses two major activities a state carries out - protection and extraction. The wealthy landlords were clients of the prince. It was therefore in the prince's best interest to attack and check the rivals of his principal allies. Extraction of resources from the local population was not an easy task. Peasants who had to scratch out a daily living from the earth rarely gave up their sustenance or labor voluntarily. Extraction and protection both required coercion. It was this internal, central coercion that led to a consolidated, central state authority (Tilly, 1992, pp. 96-97).

This coercion was accomplished by the armed forces which were essentially acting as a primitive police force when oriented to control the national population. In addition to waging war against external threats, internally this "police force" not only helped extract taxes from the population, it "spent much of its effort disarming, isolating, or co-opting rival claimants to state power." (Tilly, 1992, p. 76) A.F. Mullins (1987) describes the European experience in terms of a feedback model: pre-state institutions develop politically as a response to external threats or opportunities (see Fig 2.1). The two assumptions necessary to validate this model are 1) military force is used for both external and internal security and 2) the international system requires a law of the jungle. Meaning, "only military force or the threat of force can prevent the expansion of power by national rulers." (Mullins, 1987, p. 9) Historically, these two assumptions accurately describe the international relations system of the 16th and 17th centuries.



Fig 2.1. Feedback model of military capability and development. (Mullins, 1987, p. 13)

> As armies grew in size and sophistication after 1300, they became increasingly expensive, forcing the rulers of the European proto-states into increased penetration of their polities in order to extract the resources necessary to finance these forces. The payoff from this effort was twofold; not only did those armies created by this process handle the external security requirements, but at the same time they provided the wherewithal to achieve still greater levels of internal penetration by the central government. A feedback effect was thus obtained. Greater military power led to a greater capacity for penetration, which permitted still greater military power, and so forth. (Mullins, 1987, p. 9)

The best example of how all these factors (war-making and state-making through coercion, extraction and protection) fit together is 17th century absolutist France. During the reign of Louis XIV, the glue that ensured that the coercive, extractive, and protective demands of the monarch were carried out was the bureaucracy. The *intendants* were the key to the penetration of the state into the periphery and into civil society.

> Loyal, dependent, and increasingly separate from society, the *intendants* clearly represented one of the key corollaries of centralization: the development of a body of officials, whose recruitment and policy execution was separated gradually from the previously existing involvement of officials with kinship loyalties, hereditary privileges and property interests. (Callaghy, 1984, p. 129)

Approximately thirty-five *intendants* replaced the hereditary noble governors in the provinces. Their position was not based on heredity or purchase and they could be fired at

any time. They were dependent on the king and his ministers for everything related to their jobs – appointment, compensation, rotation and promotion. The *intendants* were the beginning of the break from the corruptible patron-client networks of earlier periods. They were generally not assigned to their home regions so they could intervene in local disputes more impartially and effectively. They rotated to a different province every three years but were sometimes moved along more frequently due to lingering patron-client ties. (Callaghy, 1984, p. 130)

To discourage corruption (which still occurred anyway), strict supervision was maintained over them. Inspectors were sent from Paris regularly and the *intendants'* subordinates, the subdelegates, were sometimes used to report on them. They were centrally trained in Paris and often made trips to the capitol for consultation. Although they were granted generous discretionary powers, they were not autonomous. They were continuously monitored to ensure that their actions were compatible with the interests of the state. (Callaghy, 1984, pp.129-130)

The *intendants* were responsible for "direct tax collections, royal justice, economic regulation, and the maintenance of internal order." (Skocpol, 1979, p. 52) Their power over society developed slowly. Initially they started out with the extraction-protection roles described earlier. They gradually expanded their powers into adjudication, distribution, and production. These new activities gave the *intendants* greater authority to intervene among members of the subject population in order to settle their disputes, allocate their goods, and control the creation and transformation of these goods. (Tilly, 1992, p. 97) All of these events and processes contributed to the efficiency and increased the political and economic development of the states.

These controlling activities were certainly not met by society without resistance. No one wants to pay taxes or be forced to serve in the military, especially a peasant whose labor provides the sustenance and survival of his family. Revolts against the state occurred often. For the *intendant*, maintaining order via his general police powers was a full time job in itself. Although he had the authority to call in royal military troops to suppress a serious revolt, he eventually absorbed the policing powers that had traditionally lay with the local authorities and nobles (Callaghy, 1984, p.131).

Through the use of an elaborate, centrally controlled and loyal bureaucracy, monarchs were able to penetrate society and have their demands, through edicts and laws, imposed on their subjects. As mentioned in the previous paragraph, the expansion of absolute authority over a subject population entailed a high degree of violence. In the next section, I will analyze why this activity was so violent.

2. The Violence of State-Making

European state formation occurred at a very dynamic time in history. The emergence of capitalism and private property along with industrialization and urbanization dislocated the traditional peasant activities of Western Europe to an extreme not previously experienced. Prior to the rise of capitalism, which both Marx and Weber date to the 16th century, Western Europe can be described as a traditional state. Some characteristics of a traditional state include a class-divided society, an absence of labor markets and a virtual inability to break away from ones subsistence ties to land. (Giddens, 1987, p. 64) Put simply, the class divisions in this type of society included the "haves" and the "have nots." The "haves" were the ruling class; the monarchs, the nobles, and the like. The "have nots" were the peasants; those who tilled the earth for their own day-to-day

sustenance. This was a relatively peaceful time in history. This is because the peasants' daily lives were usually free from contact with the state, as well as with one another.

> The sheer physical, social and cultural distance between dominant and subordinate classes ensures that they rarely meet in open, collective struggle of any sort. Except in very unusual circumstances, peasant labor is not conducted under the direct surveillance of members of the dominant class. Peasants cannot threaten to 'withdraw their labor', not just because they lack the organizational means to do so, but because they could not then survive, since they produce their own means of subsistence. (Giddens, 1987, p. 65)

For the most part, the peasants were left alone. Of course they had to pay some sort of taxes for using the lord of the manor's mill or plot of land, but this payment was in-kind (i.e., a small percentage of his crop). But for states of the 17th century to carry on their war-making endeavors, they needed cash. Therefore, they had to develop new fiscal strategies which included payment of taxes by peasants in the form of currency. For the more commercialized, capital-intensive states, such as the Netherlands, Genoa, and Venice, it was much easier to collect taxes in cash than it was elsewhere. (Tilly, 1992, pp. 87, 90)

The three interrelated phenomena of private property, urbanization and industrialization gave rise to capitalism. According to Giddens, "Capital is essentially property that is freely alienable." (1987, p. 69). For 17th and 18th century England, commerce set in motion the trend of concentration of land into the hands of a few. Through the enclosure process, peasants were forced off the land and made to work as wage laborers. Those no longer holding property rights were either hired laborers in the countryside, digging ditches or putting in enclosure hedges, or had to move to the city to seek employment from the new industrial employers (Moore, 1966, pp. 25-27).

This process of being torn from the land, the only guaranteed source of sustenance, and being forced to pay taxes, provoked major resistance on the part of peasants and lower classes. Within the span of one hundred years peasant communities were changed by capitalism, private property, urbanization, industrialization, payment of taxes in cash, forced conscription, and cultural homogenization.

> In the period of movement from tribute to taxes, from indirect to direct rule, from subordination to assimilation, states generally worked to homogenize their populations and break down their segmentation by imposing common languages, religions, currencies, and legal systems. When those standardizing efforts threatened the very identities on which subordinate populations based their everyday social relations, however, they often stirred massive resistance. (Tilly, 1992, p. 100)

For a United States citizen in the late twentieth century, it is hard to imagine the extent to which a peasant's life was transformed. According to Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs, man's basic needs include food and water, shelter and security. All of these were being drained by the state. Peasants had nothing to lose by revolting.

"State intervention in everyday life incited popular collective action," (Tilly, 1992, p. 99). Sometimes this resistance came from just the peasants, but many times, the peasants joined forces with the nobility to threaten the crown.

> The translation from class structure to state organization occurred through struggle. The tax rebellions that shook much of western Europe during the seventeenth century sprang from the competing claims of kings, regional power-holders, local communities, and individual households to land, labor, commodities, cattle, tools, credit, and household wealth that could not serve all ends at once. When resistance to taxation aligned the claims of great lords with those of local communities, as it often did in early seventeenth-century France, it threatened the very viability of the crown. But even on a smaller scale, day-to-day individual and collective action against the growing state-s extractive efforts posed serious challenges too every ruler. (Tilly, 1992, p. 100)

The Thirty Years' War is a good example of how war-making, extraction, and protection, all elements of state-making, incited collective action all across Western Europe. "England went through a civil war, France entered the turmoil of the Fronde, Scotland almost shook itself free of England, and Catalonia and Portugal broke loose from the Spanish crown." (Tilly, 1992, p. 101)

Violence however, was not prevalent all the time. When faced with resistance, rulers often bargained a compromise with their subjects. It was after all, in their best interest to do so. Of course, troops were called in to suppress a tax rebellion, but exemplary punishment was often used – "hanging a few ring leaders rather than all the rebels, jailing the richest local taxpayer instead of all the delinquents" were all forms of bargaining (Tilly, 1992, p. 101). It was in the state's best interest to "bargain" for a number of reasons. First, the state did not always have the manpower to crush all violators; a few public executions got the point across. Second, this was the era in which the crown formed indigenous armies instead of hiring mercenaries. Killing your populace also meant killing future conscripts. Finally, executing or jailing your populace also meant diminishing your own state coffers since it would be that much less revenue collected in taxes. Bargaining, however, was more often than not coercion over compliance since it was the state that had the monopoly on the means of violence. "At the showdown, [it was] cannon versus staves." (Tilly, 1992, p.102)

In the state-making process (using Western Europe as a model) a large degree of violence is inherent in the accumulation of central state power. This violence comes in the form of both protection from external security threats (war-making) and internal suppression (extraction).

> As centralizing, war-making state builders increased their resource demands on their population, the tax, food and conscription riots often became the harbinger of much larger rebellions pitting nobles and peasants against monarchical agents of national state centralization. By 1900, there were about twenty times fewer independent polities in Europe than there had been in 1500. They did not disappear peacefully or decay as the national state developed; they were the losers in a protracted war of all against all. (Cohen, Brown, Organski, 1981, p. 902)

Just as Western Europe in the 16th and 17th centuries experienced this pain of developing statehood, sub-Saharan Africa is currently undergoing this process. However, as Charles Tilly, Joel Migdal, Mohammed Ayoob and numerous other scholars of the state-making process point out, the European experience can not repeat itself in today's new states (Tilly, 1975, p. 81).

B. WEAK STATES OF THE THIRD WORLD

Tilly's work describes how strong states were made. In this section, I will review primarily Migdal's analysis of the state-making process in the Third World, with occasional reference to the similar theories of Thomas Callaghy (1984). I will suggest that Africa's state-making process will not only be pervaded with violence but also runs the risk of being more violent than the Europeans' process for two main reasons: intervention by the international community and a continuation of pre-colonial social and political institutions. Migdal's model does not directly address these points and therefore I will save my analysis of them for the next chapter. Nevertheless, Africa fits (not necessarily neatly, but it fits) into Migdal's general outline of how Third World states lacking certain structural conditions continue to be weak.

Migdal's book is divided into three parts. The first part sets the stage with a model of how states and societies interact with one another in Third World countries in the

twentieth century. The driving point to Migdal's first chapter is that we need to analyze how social control is actually distributed in a society.

"Social control for the state entails more than insinuation, or penetration, of its agencies into society, more even than just successful extraction of resources. It includes the ability to appropriate resources for particular purposes and to regulate people's daily behavior." (Migdal, 1988, p. 261) In terms of Migdal's theory, "the starting point for analysis is the environment of conflict." (Migdal, 1988, p. 261)

According to Migdal, "the major struggles in many societies, especially those with fairly new states, are over who has the right and ability to make the countless rules that guide people's social behavior." (1988, p. 31) In some states, such as the United States and Western Europe, that authority is vested in an elected legislative body and executive. In other states, such as Iran, the leading religious authority makes the rules. In still others, like Jordan, a monarchy continues to exist. But in the non-modernized Third World, society's organizational strategy is based on meeting the needs of survival.

In the second part of Migdal's book, he answers the question of when and how the social organizations that now resist the state-making process established their social control. The answer lies in two sets of related forces which produced a massive dislocation in the traditional societies' survival strategies. Those two forces are a) the extension of the world economy out of Europe and its subsequent puncture into the Third World at all levels of society, and b) the new political order established and maintained by colonialism (Migdal, 1988, p. 51).

Migdal claims that there were three types of European colonial state policies implemented in varying degrees across the Third World which weakened the old social and political arrangements:

- changes in land tenure,
- new forms and procedures of taxation, and
- new modes of transportation. (Migdal, 1988, p. 56)

Migdal then uses two case studies to illustrate his point of how the differences in these above mentioned factors, even by the same colonizer (Britain), led in one instance to a strong state (Israel) and in another into a weak state (Sierra Leone). He determines that there are two conditions necessary to consolidate the social control that leads to a strong state: "rapid and universal dislocation [of traditional social control] and the channeling of resources to indigenous organizations capable of extending social control throughout society." (Migdal, 1988, p. 173)

Migdal claims in his case studies that Sierra Leone fits the first condition but not the second. Israel, on the other hand, fits both. Migdal could have chosen any country in sub-Saharan Africa to make this point because they are all weak. Although colonization was a massive dislocation of African society, it did not sufficiently weaken the old social and political arrangements – especially transformations in land tenure. The three types of European colonial state policies referred to earlier were not implemented adequately in sub-Saharan Africa. This point will be elaborated on further in the next chapter.

It is at this point, the method by which the central European government administered its policies to society, that Migdal's theory blends with that of Thomas Callaghy, published four years earlier, in 1984. Their theories on how Third World bureaucracies operate are consistent with that of Louis XIV's use of the *intendants* in the

17th century. Comparing the two bureaucratic relationships goes a long way toward explaining why France succeeded and why African states appear to be floundering using the same strategy.

The Europeans administered via indirect rule using what Callaghy calls a "coverover" strategy:

> ...adopt and adapt to an inherited political structure. The modified administrative and political structure is then laid over pre-existing traditional authority structures in order to control them and to emasculate their strength through gradual centralization and concentration of power. (Callaghy, 1984, p. 97)

But early modern Europe also used this strategy. Some of the peripheral provinces in France, such as Languedoc, Provence, Loraine and Alsace, retained some privileges under absolutism, such as seignorial domains or selling offices (Skocpol, 1979, pp. 52-53). So why did France succeed in state-building while African states appear to have failed?

Both Migdal and Callaghy believe a strong administration is the key to a strong state; however they both attribute the failure of African state-makers to exogenous forces. Callaghy puts emphasis on the international system (Callaghy, 1984, p. 417). I too, believe the international system gives undue legitimacy to current African states while at the same time putting unneeded pressure on them to allow the same liberal "rights" enjoyed by the industrialized Western societies. I will elaborate on this point further in the next chapter.

Migdal, on the other hand, attributes the persistence of Africa's weak states and its regimes' continued fragmentation of social control, to the colonial legacy. European colonizers reconstituted social control in the hands of the local chiefs, or what Migdal refers to as strongmen. In terms of the Third World, strongmen are defined as those individuals capable of exercising localized social control – rich peasants, priests,

landlords, etc. In Africa, these strongmen who still maintain a tight grip over society are in some instances traditional authority figures (chiefs, elders, etc.) but may also be leaders in society who have obtained their status "by the gun," such as Jonas Savimbi of Angola or Charles Taylor of Liberia. It was in their best interests to keep society fragmented because they could retain state resources and ensure their own personal stability and security and social control (i.e., survival). (Migdal, 1988, p. 127)

This fragmentation of society is continually reinforced today in what Migdal refers to as the politics of survival. Third World leaders' insecurity about their own personal tenure or their lack of confidence in state institutions has led them towards inefficient forms of administration.

> Many regimes of newly independent states felt politically insecure for various reasons - deep ethnic divisions, a very shallow sense of nationhood, thinly established political institutions with little depth of experience, lack of indigenous managerial and technical talent, extreme economic dependence, and revolutionary popular expectations generated by the independence struggle. The new state structures were generally lacking in the power, resources, legitimacy, and societal support to meet these challenges. (Diamond, 1988b, pp. 5-6)

The politics of survival includes three main activities: circulation of staff, non-merit-based appointments, and dirty tricks. Shuffling ministers, commanders of armed forces and top bureaucrats around can "prevent threatening centers of power from coalescing." (Migdal, 1988, p. 214) Politics of survival also entails appointment to government positions based on deep personal relationships (schoolmates, for example), nepotism, or shared regional or ethnic origins and not merit. In other words, appointment to government positions is not based on what you know but who you know; designed to ensure loyalty to the individual president. Another form of non-merit appointment is to

co-opt government positions to potential threatening opponents. This can allay pressure from a potential rival because for the recipient of a co-opted position to keep his cushy government job, the desires of the state leaders become the recipients desires. Co-optation can also backfire. Coups have often been led by the second in charge. (Migdal, 1988, pp. 214-217)

Third, state elites have often been able to stay afloat by playing dirty tricks, such as quickly (and illegally) changing the law, including the constitution, or illegally imprisoning or deporting key figures. All of these elements of the politics of survival prevent a bureaucratic class from developing within the state. (Migdal, 1988, p. 226) Essentially, Africa's bureaucracy is a product of the neopatrimonial practices of its regimes. Meaning,

> ...the chief executive maintains authority through personal patronage, rather than through ideology or law. The right to rule is ascribed to a person rather than an office. Relationships of loyalty and dependence pervade a formal political and administrative system and leaders occupy bureaucratic offices less to perform public service than to acquire personal wealth and status. The distinction between private and public interests is purposely blurred. (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1994: 46, p. 458)

This is one of the key reasons why African states continue to be weak, and it will be discussed more extensively in the second part of the next chapter. Europe got beyond this stage but in many cases it took a couple of centuries and a revolution such as the French Revolution in 1789. Africa, however, remains stuck in the infant stages of state-making.

The last relationship in Migdal's model is the triangle of accommodation between the implementers, politicians, and strongmen. Implementers are those middle-level bureaucrats who "take the programs, legislation, and policy statements of leaders and acting responsibly on those guidelines, make them the rules of daily behavior." (Migdal,

1988, p. 239) Implementers face pressure from various sources: their supervisors, intended clients (i.e., interest groups) of the policies they are trying to implement, peer bureaucrats from other state agencies, and local strongmen. What motivates implementers' actions when confronted by these pressures are considerations of their own careers – their own security and job mobility. "The politics of survival lessens backing and threats of sanctions from supervisors, thus making the implementer more attentive to possible career costs involving strongmen and peer officials. The result is a further weakening of the state's ability to make the rules governing people's behavior." (Migdal, 1988, pp. 240-241)

Implementers are often reluctant to enforce tough policies handed down from above because the minister trying to push these policies through may be gone in a few weeks. Therefore, looking out for his own career, the implementer appears to be contributing to the program in public but it is actually just a gesture. In order to maintain their own security and survival in the long run, the implementers bargain with the local strongmen because they still provide the strategies of survival of social control (Migdal, 1988, p. 243). "Local strongmen, through the social control they exercise, have performed critical functions for state and party personnel. They have turned out the vote (where there are elections), they have maintained stability, and they have provided access to constituencies. In turn, strongmen have received special benefits from the officials." (Migdal, 1988, p. 244)

These strongmen continue to exist because, as cited above, they provide politicians with the means of short-term survivability. Politicians are essentially in a position where, if they cannot beat them, they join them. Yet in the long run, they keep society fragmented by maintaining local control and using state resources to maintain their power. The

structure of society – the implementers, strongmen, and politicians and the web of accommodation they have woven amongst themselves – goes far in explaining the continued weakness of Third World states. Migdal's model is summarized in the following figure.



Fig. 2.2 An Interactive Model of Relations Between Weak Third World States and Their Societies. (Migdal, 1988, p. 268)

So where's the violence in this process? Once a strongman or politician is in power, he tries to do everything he can to stay in and expand his power. This is because the only way to acquire wealth in tropical Africa is to somehow tap into the state apparatus.

The violence experienced in Africa since independence has stemmed from a variety of causes but they are all linked to state-building or state collapse. First, there are the attempts of various strongmen to eliminate "legitimate" state leaders. Jonas Savimbi of Angola, is an example of a strongman trying to expand his sphere of influence and gain control of the state. Second, in the neopatrimonial regimes collapsing from their own

greed and corruption (such as Somalia in the late 1980s, Uganda in the 1970s, and Liberia in the second half of the 1980s), "leaders" such as Idi Amin, Samuel Doe, and Said Barre committed oppressive and atrocious acts against *anyone* who threatened their own personal rule (as cited in Zartman, 1995, p. 37, 74, 92). In other states such as Nigeria, violence has taken on an appearance similar to that of the *intendants* of 17th century France. The hanging of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other activists in November 1995 and the illegal imprisonment of the widely respected former head of state Olusegin Obasanjo and the 1993 president-elect Moshood Abiola are all examples of exemplary punishment used by early state-makers in Western Europe (Butts and Metz, 1996, p.15).

This is neither to justify the acts of the military dictatorship in Nigeria as conducive to state-making nor to conclude that Savimbi's attempt to expand his sphere of influence is synonymous with the behavior of monarchs of 17th century France. It can also be viewed as the mere politics of survival. In reality, when a country is going through the state-making process, it is difficult to tell if its actions are truly consistent with state-making or it is only for personal accumulation of power. However, one way to tentatively determine if the violence is constructive or destructive is to monitor the growth in taxable capacity of the state as well as school enrollment figures (Migdal, 1988, pp. 279-286, and Cohen, Brown, and Organski, 1981: 75, p. 905).[1]

[1] The biggest problem with undertaking such empirical analysis of new states, such as those in sub-Saharan Africa is that this data is very difficult to obtain. As mentioned in the first chapter, academics attempting to obtain such data rarely walk away with valid or accurate statistics when conducting field research in the violent environments of collapsing states.

C. CONCLUSION

The European model, as articulated by both Tilly and Mullins, shows that there is a closely knit relationship between the growth and use of military power, both internal and external, and the political and economic development that leads to modern state institutions. Migdal's model of why many Third World states are weak focuses not on military power but on how the fragmentation of society has led state leaders to accommodate various strongmen in order to maintain their own personal political survival and social stability. It is surprising that he does not make a stronger connection between Third World states' militaries and their role in state-making. In his conclusion, Migdal states that once the traditional patterns of social control have been broken, there remain four necessary and sufficient conditions for these weak states to become strong:

- world-historical timing,
- existence of a military threat (internal or external),
- the basis for an independent bureaucracy, and
- skillful leadership. (Migdal, 1988, pp. 271-275)

But Migdal dedicates a mere four pages out of his 277-page book to the explanation of his prescription for weak Third World states. This scant attention to remedies is disappointing and insufficient to justify its inclusion as part of his theory here.

Of the handful of non-European countries Migdal assesses as having relatively strong states – Israel, Cuba, Vietnam, China, Japan, Taiwan, North and South Korea – all experienced some sort of devastating war or revolution. Yet Migdal gives this correlation only cursory mention (1988, p. 270). Mullins (1987), on the other hand, provides extensive empirical support for this linkage. By gathering data on the military capability

and economic and political development of forty-six new states,[2] Mullins' analysis convincingly shows that "the security circumstances of modern new states are different from those of their predecessors, and that these differences appear to have a marked impact on the development process." (Mullins, 1987, p. 117) He concludes that the European feedback model, in which military capability and development caused pre-state institutions to form into modern states does not apply to new states. This is because the external patronage that exists today does not allow for a "law of the jungle" for these new states to form. Hence, the existence of external patrons inverts the pressure to develop economically and politically (Mullins, 1987, pp. 104-107, 111). Mullins's data essentially validates Tilly's theory that states were made through the interrelated processes of war, extraction, and protection, as stated in the first few pages of this chapter. Despite their differences however, the theories of both authors have strong implications for the current state of affairs in sub-Saharan Africa.

[2] Defined as states with a date of independence between 1 Jan 1957 and 31 Dec 1981. The states chosen for this analysis needed to have a population greater than half a million at independence in order to make the analogy between the new states and Europe of the 17th century as close as possible.

III. OVERVIEW OF SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

This chapter will serve as a general overview of the sub-Saharan African region to provide a background understanding as to the root cause of conflict there and the context in which foreign military intervention takes place. Specifically, the following questions will be addressed:

- What is its colonial legacy?
- What are the continuing constraints to the political development of sub-Saharan African states?

A. COLONIAL LEGACY

Colonization, in Africa as everywhere else, involved a rapid dislocation of the traditional survival strategies of the community. Strategies of survival are the ways in which a community of people "combine available symbols with opportunities to solve mundane needs for food, housing and the like. Such strategies provide not only a basis for personal survival but also a link for the individual from the realm of personal identity and self-serving action (a personal political economy) to the sphere of group identity and collective action (a communal moral economy)." (Migdal, 1988, p. 27) But in Africa, due to the relatively short length of time and inconsistency of its approach, many of these former strategies were not totally destroyed so that new institutions capable of making and enforcing decisions on a much greater scale than the village community could survive. Hence, caught between the old and the new, African regimes have been floundering ever since.

The purpose of this section is to explain the colonial legacy in sub-Saharan Africa, describing what aspects of colonization contributed to Africa's ongoing stagnation. Specifically, the following questions will be examined:

- Why and how did Europe partitioned Africa?
- What institutions did the Europeans govern with and with what institutions did they leave the Africans to govern?
- What economic developments were set in place to support the political structure?
- How did the Europeans deal with the heterogeneous societies they helped create?
- What are the origins of the African armies?

The answers to all these questions contribute to why African states are weak and what structural constraints are preventing them from becoming strong. Because these constraints still exist, African states remain in a violent cycle of state-building then state collapse. United States military forces are requested to intervene in these states to restore order and stability. But in doing so, they are keeping the pre-colonial social and political institutions intact, preventing consolidation of a central authority.

1. The Scramble

Africa was the last continent to be colonized by Europe. Although trading ports had been established as early as the 1400s (by the Portuguese) for such goods as gold, ivory, slaves, and palm oil, Europeans rarely ventured more than a few miles from shore. Sub-Saharan Africa was still a very inhospitable place in terms of climate and geography. The dense tropical rainforest, vast deserts, and unnavigatable waterways and cataracts – not to mention the scorching heat and plethora of diseases such as malaria and sleeping

sickness – made it extremely difficult to penetrate. It was not until the 1870s that explorers such as Livingstone, Stanley, Brazza, and Cameron enlightened the governments of Europe about the perceived treasures in the interior of Africa and rekindled their interest in the still largely mysterious "dark continent."

From that point on, the conquest of Africa became a veritable "scramble." Historians are puzzled (as were politicians of the time) as to why Europe rushed to build an empire in sub-Saharan Africa (Pakenham, 1991, p. xxi). For the smaller European countries, like Belgium, exploitation of tropical colonies was thought to pay hand over fist. Great Britain was leading the world in the Industrial Revolution. Their historic rival, France, was following close behind. Colonies provided the raw materials needed for growing manufacturing countries to flourish. The European powers "partitioned Africa mainly in order to ensure they would not be excluded from regions which might prove valuable in the future" (Oliver and Atmore, 1994, p. 124). According to King Leopold of Belgium, "It was colonies that gave modern states power and prosperity" (Pakenham, 1991, p. 13).

After almost two decades of the scramble, Africa was partitioned on paper at a conference table in Europe in 1885 (Treaty of Berlin). Seven different European countries colonized various territories across the continent (see Fig 3.1) The boundaries of these territories which the European powers carved for themselves were decided largely without regard for existing cultural groups or political systems (Diamond, 1988b, p. 6).

Somalia is a good example of this arbitrary partitioning. The territory occupied by the Somali ethnic group takes up all or part of five different present-day states. The



Fig 3.1. Africa: The Final Stage of Partition, 1914
(Oliver and Atmore, 1994, p. 122)

British were the first to come and establish formal protectorates with the clan families of northwest Somalia in 1886. This area became known as British Somaliland. The French appeared at about the same time and established concessions with present-day Djibouti. The Italians established their colony in 1893 in what is currently known as Somalia. Not long after that, the Ethiopian emperor, Menilek, expanded his state to the east and asserted control over the Somali-inhabited Ogaden region. Finally, the British colonists claimed authority over the northeastern section of Kenya, a territory inhabited by Somali (see Fig 3.2). The five-pointed star on the Somali flag serves as a reminder of the early desire for a united Somalia (Lyons and Samatar, 1995, pp. 11, 15).

Nigeria is an example of how the Europeans consolidated three very diverse ethnic regions into one state: the Hausa-Fulani of the north, the Igbo to the southeast, and the Yoruba to the southwest. Although these predominant ethnic communities (as well as 200 other small communities) existed in limited competition with one another prior to colonization, "the British divided Nigeria into three regions whose boundaries conformed with the pattern of ethnic concentration." (Diamond, 1988a, p. 23) Religion further complicated this scheme because in the Northern Region, Islam was the transethnic identity; in the East, Christianity was the norm, particularly among Igbos, and amongst the Yoruba in the West, there was a fairly even split between Islam and Christianity (Diamond, 1988a, p. 25). Britain ruled Nigeria through separate administrations. The Northern Region was actually a pre-colonial kingdom with pre-existing emirates due to its Islamic influence. It was administered by indirect rule through traditional authorities. In other words, it was pretty much shielded from Western influence. But in the south, the English language, as well as Western education and religion were promoted. This had a



Fig 3.2. Distribution of Somali Ethnic Group
(Lyons and Samatar, 1995, p. ix)

profound effect on the lack of development of a common national identity, as well as education and economic opportunities afforded to the south but not the north. These divisions and influences are still felt today. (Diamond, 1988a, pp. 26-27)

2. Political

The Europeans created colonial states in Africa that were essentially military administrative hierarchies. This means there was no distinction between the decision-making apparatus and the implementation roles of the government.

> The political culture bequeathed by colonialism contained the notions that authoritarianism was an appropriate mode of rule and that political activity was merely a disguised form of self-interest, subversive of the public welfare. (Chazan et al., 1992, pp. 42-43)

Internal legitimacy, via mediation or consultation was not part of the model.

European colonial powers also had to administer via indirect rule. This meant that traditional authorities (chieftains, priests, etc.) were to collect taxes from the populace under their control (skim some off for themselves) and give the rest to the colonial administration. The British especially ruled extensively in this manner in such areas as Ghana and Nigeria. Under this system, many of these traditional authorities gained new influence and patronage and became quite powerful. But in preparation for decolonization, the Europeans attempted to consolidate authority into a central state apparatus. This was met with a lot of resistance on behalf of these traditional authorities because they did not want to lose their own power. (Freund, 1984, p. 213)

Neither did the Europeans appropriately prepare the Africans for decolonization. Notions of decolonizing Africa were first articulated in 1945, immediately following WWII, but the actual date of independence was left open-ended. There were insufficient

numbers of Africans educated enough to staff these bureaucracies. And although many civil service positions were held by Africans, particularly in the French colonial states, there were more technical skills instead of bureaucratic competence.

Generally speaking, the Europeans ruled in authoritarian fashion but in the last fifteen years of colonization, attempted to set up parliamentary democracies. Constitutions were developed and political parties and parliaments sensitive to African pluralist societies were created. These institutions were totally foreign from the example set for the new leaders by the centralized, authoritarian colonial administration (Chazan, et al., 1992, p. 45).

3. Economic

The colonial state put tremendous restrictions on African economic survival strategies. The imperial conquest of Africa tapped African resources with the intent to alleviate the economic problems of Europe and provide a source of raw materials for the continuation of the Industrial Revolution. But the economic development initiated by the colonists was very statist in nature, as opposed to encouraging capitalist enterprise. "It discouraged the development of an indigenous capitalist class by favoring the metropole's industrial exports and foreign firms." (Diamond, 1988b, p. 7)

State monopolies controlled both the mining industries as well as agricultural cash exports. Various mineral deposits of diamonds, gold, tin and copper were found throughout Africa. Often these mines were discovered in sparsely populated areas, so that labor had to be obtained through force and coercion. Where minerals could not be found, the state turned to the African peasants to squeeze out whatever surplus wealth they could. Firestone rubber in Liberia and Unilever palm-oil in the Belgian Congo are

examples of companies that bought these commodities from African peasants at monopoly prices and then sold them on the world market at a much higher price. In Kenya, the white settlers found that the African peasants could grow coffee on a small scale just as well as they could on their plantations. This white settlers therefore pressured the colonial state to impose a "white only" coffee growing policy. (Freund, 1984, pp. 111-112, 118, 123)

Thus, the state marketing boards which still exist in sub-Saharan Africa today originated in colonial history. However, during the colonial period, the reserves generated by the marketing boards were ordinarily mandated to be spent on purposes beneficial to the farming community because that is where the greatest volume of wealth was produced. But upon independence, the new state apparatus had no source of funds and therefore diverted these funds from the marketing agencies into the public coffers. Rather than being reinvested into the agricultural sector, the newly independent states used some of these resources to help support more modern activities such as industry and manufacturing. Inevitably however, much of this resource was used to grease the patron-client network. (Bates, 1981, pp. 12-14)

These marketing boards relate to political institutions in that this is where the state receives anywhere from 20 to 40 percent of the resources for its budget (Bates, 1981, p. 17). But in attempting to accumulate as much revenue as possible, the marketing boards usually end up offering the producer of the cash crop less than world market value; sometimes less than two-thirds of its potential sales realization and sometimes less than one-half. Unable to make a living, the producer (peasant) reverts back to subsistence farming and the state ends up getting less revenue.

The development of infrastructure was also lacking. Development was not a high priority on the agenda as it was in India, especially under the Dalhousie administration in the 1850s (Moon, 1989, pp. 653-664). The lack of any pre-existing infrastructure or system of wage labor that could be employed for public works such as building, road-making, and portage, was a significant obstacle. The colonial authorities practically had to start from scratch. Additionally, the colonization period in Africa was relatively short, from about 1885-1960 (almost 75 years). Compared to British colonial rule in India, about 1792-1947 (155 years), it was short indeed. Railroads were ill-suited to the terrain and population dispersal of Africa making it that much harder for economic development, since products from the interior had to be slowly transported to the coast by foot or river (Oliver and Atmore, 1994, p. 127). Even at independence, railroads across the continent were scarce and often not connected. (see Fig 3.3)

4. Social

The biggest social impact the colonial state had on Africa was accentuation of ethnic differences. Ethnic awareness in Africa is not an ancient primordial consciousness but a relatively new phenomena with roots in colonial history. The intense competition over power, status, economic resources, and social services caused a heightened ethnic awareness not known before. In some cases, "for administrative convenience, colonial governments encouraged the integration of autonomous sections living side by side in order to consolidate territory and identity groups." (Chazan, et al., 1992, p. 107)

But more often than not, the colonists tended to contribute more to ethnic conflict rather than curb it. Wherever the colonizing power went, no matter from what European country, they always chose their favorites – "people who by good luck or good judgment



Fig 3.3. Railroads of Africa 1960
(Curtin et al., 1995, p. 461)

made common cause with the colonial power and received privileged treatment." (Oliver and Atmore, 1994, p. 142) This privileged treatment came in the form of clerical or low-level administrative jobs, territory or indirect ruler authority, or educational opportunities. Some examples include the Barotse of Northern Rhodesia, the Baganda of Uganda, the Fulbe from northern Nigeria, Yoruba from Lagos, Igbos from the coastal towns of the lower Niger, and the Tutsi of Rwanda and Burundi. The effects of this ethnic strife is clearly seen to this day – from the Biafran War of the late 1960s to the genocide in Rwanda in the early 1990s. (Oliver and Atmore, 1994, pp. 142-143)

5. Military

One of the most important, yet overlooked aspects of the sub-Saharan Africa colonial legacy involves the origins and use of the army. In 17th century Europe, the military was an essential factor that drove political and economic development. This feedback relationship, as described on page 23, led to the formation of modern national states.

The four big European colonizers of sub-Saharan Africa were Britain, France, Belgium, and Portugal. Each had very different polices regarding the formation of African colonial armies, but the main thing they had in common was that they were all "created for colonial defense and modified for internal security duty." (Mullins, 1987, p. 22) Even though Africa was eventually divided on paper in 1885, the Europeans fought against each other prior to this for possession of these territories. After the Treaty of Berlin, the colonial armies were used to force (or attempt to force) the hinterland chieftains into submission.

European colonizing powers differed greatly in their policies regarding the degree of racial equality and integration, ethnic and geographic recruitment and organization, training, and preparation for independence. But by the end of colonial rule none of these armies was strong enough to defend its external artificial borders nor properly trained or equipped for enforcing internal security, especially since none had experience serving under an indigenous regime. "In a sense, the European experience had been reversed; the creation of the state had preceded the creation of the national army." (Mullins, 1987, p. 22) Putting powerful weapons (not just guns, but tanks, missiles, and fighter aircraft) into the hands of the leaders of these politically weak and socially fragmented states was a dangerous proposition. It is a wonder that more violence did not take place in the first post-independence years.

6. Colonial Legacy – Summary

The purpose of this section has been to show how the nature of colonization in Africa set in place structural impediments to development. First, the new African leaders at independence, who experienced colonial rule under bureaucratic and authoritarian institutions, were expected to govern using models of parliamentary democracy. Second, the African statist economy was weak and limited in its ability to develop an indigenous capitalist class system traditionally part of democratic states. Third, the heterogeneous society of almost all African states put immediate pressure on new leaders who lacked the economic capacity and political support to meet these demands. Finally, these new African leaders had at their disposal "military forces too weak to defend the state borders but often strong enough to control the government." (Mullins, 1987, p. 38)

In the next section, I will show why sub-Saharan Africa continues to be characterized by weak states almost forty years after independence. Basic structural impediments, erected during the colonial period, continue to hinder the consolidation of authority into a centralized state. Chapter II showed that Western Europe was able to break through these obstacles because state formation occurred at the same time as the of three interrelated phenomena: private property, urbanization, and capitalism. In many of today's Third World countries, the Europeans exposed the colonial states to the world capitalist economy and broke the traditional strategies of survival for them. But in sub-Saharan Africa, that break between tradition and modernity was not clean and many of the former strategies continue to persist not just because of indigenous factors but because the international community continues to intervene to maintain that status quo.

B. CONSTRAINTS TO STATE FORMATION

There are two main constraints to state formation in sub-Saharan Africa. The first is the continuation of pre-colonial social and political institutions. The second is persistent international intervention (militarily, politically, and economically) into the affairs of sub-Saharan African countries. The latter however, also affect the former. It is my intention in this section to show that the international community, despite its good intentions, shares in the responsibility for keeping African states weak.

1. Pre-colonial Social and Political Institutions

a. Neopatrimonial Regimes

The colonial legacy laid the foundation for and set in motion the construction of neopatrimonial regimes, or personal rule.

> In neopatrimonial regimes, the chief executive maintains authority through personal patronage, rather than through ideology or law. As with classic patrimonialism, the right to rule is ascribed to a person rather than an office. In contemporary neopatrimonialism, relationships of loyalty and dependence pervade a formal political and administrative system and leaders occupy bureaucratic offices less to perform public service than to acquire personal wealth and status. The distinction between private and public interests is purposely blurred. The essence of neopatrimonialism is the award by public officials of personal favors, both within the state (notably public sector jobs) and in society (for instance, licenses, contracts, and projects). In return for material rewards, clients mobilize political support and refer all decisions upward as a mark of deference to patrons. (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1994: 46, p. 458)

Neopatrimonial practice, as the core feature of politics in Africa is consistent with Migdal's theory of relations between weak Third World states and their societies – specifically, the fragmentation of social control and the triangle of accommodation. Today's African ruler attains his position as chief executive generally in one of two ways, either through some form of a military coup or by election (sometimes fair, sometimes rigged). But authority does not necessarily come with the job because there are still strongmen who exercise localized social control. These strongmen are a threat to the African leader's power. Conversely, the strongmen need to find ways to obtain the goods and services desired by his own subjects to assure his own security. These resources could only be found in the state. Therefore, patron-client relations became the prevailing form of political exchange. (Chazan, et al., 1992, p. 178)

This accommodation between strongmen and personal ruler exists because of a lack of intermediary institutions between government and society and a lack of economic development.

> What was palpably missing in most countries were organized structures of exchange backed by legally sanctioned rules for interaction between government officials and citizens. These structural linkages had not been

> developed during the colonial period and were given little time to solidify and become part of everyday practice during decolonization. When pressures on government from different quarters mounted immediately after independence, other means of achieving support and responding to demands had to be established. The answer was found in most countries though the more personal mechanism of clientelistic ties. (Chazan, et al., 1992, p. 178)

This missing link between state and society persists today, preventing society from maintaining any government accountability.

Second, since Africa's indigenous economic capability was severely retarded at independence, the only source of wealth came from the state (which also came from external patronage and development aid). Most states were dependent on a one-crop economy, which made them even more vulnerable to the vagaries of the world economy. Additionally, the state did not have control over the peasants who grew this one crop. Capitalist enterprises were discouraged since colonial rule, and infrastructure was virtually non-existent. Strongmen had no choice but to rely on the state for wealth. In turn, African leaders gave these goods and services in exchange for the strongmen's political support.

b. Land Tenure, Taxation, and Transportation

Migdal is right on the mark when he claims there were three types of European colonial state policies which weakened the old social and political arrangements across the Third World. These policies affected:

- changes in land tenure,
- new modes of taxation, and
- new modes of transportation. (Migdal, 1988, p. 56)

But when it came to colonizing Africa, these policies were not implemented to a sufficient degree to break the old strategies of survival. First, with very few exceptions (such as in Kenya and South Africa where there were settlers) there was no real change in land tenure. Although African farmers' land rights vary across the continent, a general perception of the paradigm of land rights is as follows:

> Initially, when there was surplus land, rights were defined for groups rather than individuals. Within the groups, individual or family rights rest on elaborate traditions and customs, which serve to enforce group control over the use and disposition of land. To minimize social friction and to ensure the groups' survival, the entitlement of individuals to specific tracts of land is transitory. As population increases and land becomes scarce, long fallow periods can no longer be relied on to maintain land fertility, and the transitory nature of land use rights fails to provide incentives for individuals to improve their land. Technologies to restore fertility require the investment of capital and effort, but must be adopted. Accordingly, farmers must be given incentives to change their ways. One important incentive is the right to permanently cultivate land and to bequeath or sell it. Secure land rights (privatization) also help rural credit market to develop, because land is good collateral. (World Bank, 1989, p. 104).

The privatization of land is a very sensitive subject when the World Bank tries to incorporate it into its structural adjustment policies (World Bank, 1989, p. 104). Traditional rights to land is the key strategy that needs to be broken. Private property and capitalism is what pulled the peasants from the land in Europe. In England for example, the establishment of enclosures and the use of commercial principles on the large and growing estates destroyed the peasant community (Moore, 1966, pp. 21, 25). France developed along a different path. Nonetheless, it was the capitalist influences radiating out from the towns, squeezing more grain out of the already reluctant peasants in the countryside, that led to the violent and bloody revolution in France in 1789 (Moore, 1966, p. 56). But in England, property went into the lands of landed gentry. In France,

the revolution destroyed the monarchy and nobility, putting private property into the hands of rich, opportunity-seeking peasants (Moore, 1966, pp. 40, 71). Only in Africa did European colonialism fail to alter traditional land tenure arrangements. Local development was low on the agenda; that included the effort needed to privatize property. (Oliver and Atmore, 1994, p. 124)

Second, although roads and railways were constructed, they were few and far between. Even in West Africa and Zaire, probably the most economically prosperous areas of all tropical Africa, there were only twenty-one railways constructed from 1885 to 1956. Although railways did have an enormous impact on the penetration of the interior, this was to a much lesser degree than that experienced by India in the mid 1800's (Migdal, 1988, pp. 75, 78-79 and Moon, 1989, pp. 660-662). Europe was unwilling to finance colonization of an area with little obvious economic value. Colonial administrations in Africa had to be self supporting, and therefore development was rather thin. The "whys" in this case are not pertinent to the fact that penetration of society via new modes of transportation did not occur to a sufficient degree to dislodge old social and political arrangements.

Finally, Migdal's third state policy that weakened pre-colonial social control is new forms and procedures of taxation. In Migdal's interpretation of Britain's colonial administration of Sierra Leone, resources (through tax extraction) were not channeled into a central state apparatus. The British administered through indirect rule, keeping local chiefs in place, forcing them to collect taxes from their own people, (skim some off for themselves) and give the rest to the colonial Governor. The British (and European colonial administrators in general) had no choice but to go through local

authority figures to implement policy. London made it clear that the African colonies needed to be economically self sufficient; this therefore cut back on the allowable manpower available to govern. (Migdal, 1988, pp. 112-114)

This section described the pre-colonial social and political institutions that persist in sub-Saharan Africa. Their existence prevents the formation of modern states based on ideology, impersonal governance, and the extraction and reallocation of resources to benefit the entire society. But as alluded to here, at least through 1990 these neopatrimonial regimes generally received resources not primarily from their own societies but from external patronage.

2. External Intervention

The clearest explanation of how the international community prevents Africa's weak states from becoming strong is in A.F. Mullins's Born Arming: Development and Military Power in New States (1987). He articulates this finding in terms of the difference between the international environment when Europe was forming into national states and from that of the 20th century when new states are developing. The key difference is that Europe was formed when a "law of the jungle" existed. This environment of survival-of-the-fittest does not apply to post-independence Africa because "the international system [of states] has altered the relationship between military power and the development process." (Mullins, 1987, p. 12) A synopsis of Mullins's argument was given in the conclusion of the previous chapter.

In an unpublished paper, Ian Lustick draws the same conclusion: Third World weak states persist due to an "external club of pre-existing Great Powers....able to penetrate their continents and enforce a paralyzingly fragmented status quo on behalf of

civilized norms of inter-state behavior." (Lustick, 1995, p. 18) The European model, discussed on pages 26 and 27, described a feedback relationship between political and economic development and military capability. African states do not have to develop to feed the military apparatus because external patronage does it for them.

> The availability of arms from foreign suppliers permits the transformation of national income directly into military capability without the need to develop the economic or political structures the European model assumes are required...[T]he presence of external patrons fundamentally alters the pressures to push development. (Mullins, 1987, pp. 108, 111)

External patronage took on more forms that just massive amounts of arms transfers. Throughout the Cold War, the United States gave billions of dollars to corrupt neopatrimonial rulers like Mobutu Sese Seko (Zaire), Daniel Arap Moi (Kenya) and Samuel Doe (Liberia) for the purpose of buying pro-Western votes in the United Nations' General Assembly or just maintaining a foothold in the region to prevent the Soviet expansion of Communism. When the Cold War ended and "Uncle Sam" became more stingy with his pocket change, weak African regimes began to fold – Somalia, Liberia, and Zaire. Not coincidentally, the states that received the most external patronage (economic and military aid) are the ones most susceptible to collapse. From 1981-85, Liberia received $402 million from the U.S. alone. This was more military and economic aid than it had received for the entire previous century (Kramer, 1995, pp. 4-5). The amount of U.S. assistance to Somalia from 1980-88 was just as staggering, estimated at $100 million per year (Adam, 1995, p. 75). Zaire is similar, with $50 million in 1988, plus $4 million in military assistance, and another $67 million in 1990, $9 million of which was military assistance (Rumphrey, March 1997, p. 8). Soviet clients such as

Ethiopia, Mozambique and Angola fared no better – and their aid was mostly in military arms.

C. CONCLUSION

The status quo of African regimes during the Cold War was obviously weak, artificial and not desired by the population of those states. State collapse, although ugly and violent in the short term, may be what African states need to reconstruct themselves into modern states. It gives civil society breathing room to develop without the oppression of personal rulers. (Adam, 1995, pp. 79-80)

From the arguments presented in this chapter, it should not be too difficult to see that the "aid" given to sub-Saharan Africa is actually hurting it in the long run. Why then, does the United States continue to dole out government-to-government aid? More importantly, why does the United States even consider "wasting" its most precious national treasure, its people, by sending military forces to intervene in these collapsed states? In the next chapter, I will specifically address the latter question, linking external military intervention to the maintenance of the pre-colonial, neopatrimonial status quo of weak African states.

IV. MILITARY INTERVENTION

Since the demise of the Cold War, the United States has perceived itself as the reluctant hegemon – the winner, who will enforce order and stability, accountability to human rights violations, and buttress economic prosperity amongst the poor, underdeveloped, and war-torn states. Since 1990, the United States has intervened militarily in civil wars throughout the world, some as part of United Nations peacekeeping forces and some unilaterally. Most (if not all; some are ongoing) have met with failure because these areas are still teeming with violence and instability.

The main purpose of this chapter is to show why external military intervention in the civil wars of sub-Saharan African states works against the formation of the development of strong states. The essential elements of this argument are rooted in basic international relations theory. First, I will address the United States's security interests in sub-Saharan Africa. Second, I will describe the two predominant international relations theories since WWII, realism and liberal internationalism, and how these theories relate to the new beliefs of how a state's culture, norms, and identity apply to U.S. foreign policy in the 1990s. Finally, I will describe how the U.S. intervenes militarily when it does not have strong interests linked to an area. Specifically, I will address the goals of intervention and its relative costs as seen by the external military force.

A. WHAT ARE THE U.S. SECURITY INTERESTS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

The term security interests is a very broad concept that needs to be defined. The United States has strategic interests, economic interests, environmental interests, etc., all of which affect U.S. security, but they are always changing and some are more important than others.

What does the United States view as a threat to its security? Richard Ullman proposed a comprehensive definition in a 1983 *International Security* article which is still valid and cited today.

> A threat to national security is an action or sequence of events that 1) threatens drastically and over a relatively brief span of time to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of a state, or 2) threatens significantly to narrow the range of policy choices available to the government of a state or to private, nongovernmental entities (persons, groups, corporations) within the state. (Ullman, 1995, p. 19)

Obviously, this is an all-encompassing definition. To further refine its meaning to reflect the needs of the United States, I will refer to the Clinton administration's A National Security Strategy for A New Century,[1] published in May 1997 in accordance with Section 603 of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Department Reorganization Act of 1986. It asserts the following as the core objectives and strategic priorities for the U.S.:

Core Objectives

- To enhance our security with effective diplomacy and with military forces that are ready to fight and win.
- To bolster America's economic prosperity.
- To promote democracy abroad.

The following strategic priorities are to be used to advance the core objectives stated above.

- Help foster a peaceful, undivided, democratic Europe
- Remain alert to the challenges (militarily and economically) in the Pacific
- Promote American prosperity in the global economy
- Continue to be an unrelenting force for peace (at reasonable risks)
- Continue to counter growing dangers to our security: weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, international crime, drugs, illegal arms trafficking, and environmental damage.
- Maintain a strong and ready military and a commitment to diplomacy.

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[1] Accessed via the Internet, http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/Strategy/ on 12 Jun 97

In particular, this document claims that "serious transnational security threats emanate from Africa, including: state-sponsored terrorism, narcotics trafficking, international crime, environmental damage and disease. These threats can only be addressed through effective, sustained engagement in Africa."

During the Cold War, United States foreign policy towards Africa was geared towards the containment of the Soviet threat (Schraeder, 1994, p. 248). Politically, African alignment was important during the Cold War because sub-Saharan Africa comprised 45 of the 181 votes in the United Nations General Assembly. In case of a veto by the Soviet Union in the Security Council, those pro-West African votes were necessary to get resolutions passed in favor of the West. Militarily, Africa served as a point for strategically located bases and training facilities for responding to military contingencies in the Middle East (Schraeder, 1994, p.18). Today, however, no state in sub-Saharan Africa is a military threat. None of its forty-five countries are nuclear capable, nor do they have a genuine, realistic military capability to threaten the territory of the United States.

From its independence until 1990, Africa was used to solve non-African problems. It was essentially a "proxy battlefield in the East-West conflict." (Schraeder, 1994, p. 248) Limiting Soviet influence was the primary national security interest of the United States in Africa, as in the rest of the world, for all presidents from Truman to Bush. The objective was to maintain the status quo – every Soviet action in Africa resulted in a U.S. reaction.

The degree of Soviet involvement in African states resulted in a proportionate level of presidential involvement in policy making towards Africa. The U.S. intervention

in Angola in 1974 is a good example. The Soviet Union and Cuba were backers of Agostinho Neto's Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (MPLA). The other two guerrilla groups in this struggle for power were Holden Roberto's Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola (FNLA) which was supported by China and Zaire, and Jonas Savimbi's Uniao Nacional para a Indepencia Total de Angola (UNITA) which was also backed by China and South Africa. Against the recommendations of State Department staff, "President Gerald Ford, at the urging of Secretary of State Kissinger, decided to intervene covertly on the side of FNLA. Kissinger saw the Angola conflict solely in terms of global politics and was determined the Soviets should not be permitted to make a move in any remote part of the world without being confronted militarily by the United States." (Schraeder, 1994, p. 29)

An example of American non-involvement in Africa during the Cold War due to a lack of national interest (Soviet influence, economic or otherwise) is Burundi during the 1972 massacres. Almost 250,000 Hutus were killed by the Tutsi minority ruling regime. But since there was no Communist involvement in this sub-region, President Nixon and National Security Advisor Kissinger remained removed from this episode, allowing the State Department's Africa Bureau to deal with it. (Schraeder, 1994, p. 20)

Diplomatic pressure was initiated to enlist the support of regional neighbors and the Organization for African Unity. But they were opposed to any such initiative since minority populations was a delicate political problem which no sub-Saharan African government wanted to face. In the end, no one did anything. According to former State Department personnel:

> For a bureaucracy which conceived its day-to-day job as the maintenance of untroubled relations with African governments, an independent American response to the Burundi killings threatened that mission. As an official of the Africa Bureau noted afterwards: "If we'd involved ourselves in this, we'd be creamed by every country in Africa for butting into an African state's internal affairs. We don't have an interest in Burundi that justified taking that kind of flack." (Schraeder, 1994, p. 21)

In the 1990s, the United States continues to treat Africa as a backburner region. According to Michael Clough, Senior Fellow for Africa at the Council on Foreign Relations, policy makers are guided by three principles in the post-Cold War era:

- Do not spend much money unless Congress makes you,
- Do not let African issues complicate policy toward other, more important parts of the world, and
- Most important, do not take stands that might create political controversies in the United States. (Schraeder, 1994, p. 250)

Finally, A National Security Strategy for A New Century mentions specifically the anticipated response the United States will make regarding humanitarian assistance.

> We [the United States] also must seek to promote reconciliation in states experiencing civil conflict and to address migration and refugee crises. To this end, the United States will provide appropriate financial support and work with other nations and international bodies, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross and the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees.[2]

Nowhere in the four paragraphs that comprise this section is the use of United States military forces for humanitarian assistance mentioned or even eluded to. This is a complete reversal of the state of affairs at the beginning of the decade. However, since the end of the Communist threat, there has been a surge of optimism among statesmen and the general populace regarding the future of international politics. The assumption is that the United States (preferably acting under the guise of a multilateral organization

[2] Accessed via the Internet, http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/Strategy on 12 June 1997.

such as the U.N. or NATO) can take the lead in collective military interventions to "root out the causes of global instability (aggression, ethnic turmoil, humanitarian disasters and collapsed states) and thereby create a favorable international climate in which the zone of peace based on democracy and free-market economics can be enlarged." (Layne, 1995, p. 85) Thus, since 1990, the United States military has been involved, either multilaterally or unilaterally, in humanitarian intervention missions around the world:

- to protect Kurdish and Shiite populations inside Iraq following the Gulf War,
- to end civil war and reestablish a democratic political order in Cambodia,
- to end starvation and construct a democratic state in Somalia, and
- most recently, to protect civilian, especially Muslim, populations from primarily Serbian forces in Bosnia. (Finnemore, 1996, p. 180)

The urge to stop or prevent these tragedies from occurring is an understandable human emotion that has existed since the 18th century Enlightenment. But military intervention, whether or not it is based on humanitarian motives, costs money. American citizens ultimately pay for it through taxation. To spur supportive public opinion for these deployments, American politicians justify military intervention based on upholding basic principles upon which Western democracies are structured: constitutional government, free-market economies and respect for human rights. Military intervention, then, eases Americans' guilt because "voters worry that their country's foreign policy implicates them in the evil acts of a foreign nation." (The Economist, 12 Apr 97, p. 19) By intervening, "the United States allow[s] its purpose to be defined by the 'guilt-and-pity crowd' that...exploit American altruism to make us responsible for mending the ills of the world." (Harries, Spring 1996, pp. 108-109)

Intervention based on interests and intervention based on norms, or perceived moral obligations, coincide with the two major theories of international relations, realism and liberalism, respectively. However, no matter why the U.S. intervenes in the civil wars of sub-Saharan Africa, the United States cannot, through the use of military force, solve the root cause of the instability and make weak African states strong. But by clearly identifying the driving force behind the intervention, as well as its long- term effects, U.S. policy makers may be able to resist domestic and international pressures to "do something," especially since intervention has historically been a contributor to the problem in the first place.

B. WHY DOES THE U.S. INTERVENE

There have been two predominant approaches to U.S. foreign policy since WWII: liberalism and realism. Liberal interventionists such as Woodrow Wilson, believe that morality is one of the pillars to foreign policy and that it is not only the United States's right, but its hegemonic responsibility and moral duty, to impose its own respect for the basic rights of man upon governments who repress their own people. (Lind, 30 Oct 1995, pp. 25, 28)

Recently, scholars have even justified humanitarian intervention based on Article IV, Section 4 of the U.S. Constitution (the Guarantee Clause), which states that "The U.S. shall guarantee to every State[3] in this Union a Republican form of Government." Morton H. Halperin and Kristen Lomasney state that since similar guarantee provisions are included in the Swiss Constitution and the German Basic Law, that

[3] Halperin and Lomasney interpret the word "State" to mean "citizen." In other words, Halperin and Lomasney believe the Guarantee Clause says the U.S. federal government guarantees to every U.S. citizen a constitutional democratic government.

> On a larger scale, the world community similarly must declare, as an exception to the international doctrine of noninterference, its readiness to protect any people that seeks to maintain the modern equivalent to republicanism – namely, constitutional democracy. Like the U.S. federal government, the international community must regard this duty of interference in the internal affairs of a state as an obligation it owes to peoples whose right to live under constitutional democracy is undermined from within their own borders. (Halperin and Lomasney, July 1993, p. 64)

Liberals have been the champions of intervention. Michael Walzer suggests that "intervention is justified when self-determination is at stake, when genocide is being committed and, more broadly, in order to put a stop to actions that... shock the conscious of mankind." (Hoffman, Winter 1995-96, p. 34) Liberals can summarize their justification in three points. First, sovereignty is a two-way street. The protection of the basic rights of its own citizens is one of the essential elements of a state's sovereignty. When the state violates these rights, it is no longer fit to govern. Second, justice comes before order. The rights of individuals and groups within a state are more important than the stability and order the state is suppose to ensure. Third, "intervention is a necessary means against chaos in a world in which domestic strife and violence risk spreading rapidly beyond borders." (Hoffman, Winter 1995-96, p. 35)

On the other hand, realists such as Henry Kissinger and George Kennan, believe America's foreign policy should be based on America's security interests. They argue that we have no choice because we all live in an anarchical world in which order and stability are maintained by a balance of power.

> The international system is anarchic, with no overarching authority providing security and order. In such a "self-help" system each state must rely on its own resources to survive and flourish, and in this uncertain climate competition and conflicts of interest abound. Because there is no authoritative, impartial method of settling these disputes – i.e. no world government – states are their own judges, juries, and hangmen, and often

> resort to force to achieve their security interests. War persists in this view because nothing exists to prevent it." (Zakaria, Winter 1992/93, pp. 22-23)

Although morality should be taken into account when making foreign policy, it should always take a back seat to interests. (The Economist, 12 Apr 1997, p. 19) The moral rules guiding individuals in their society are not the same rules which guide the international system. In the international system, although there may be treaties or agreements we call rules, there is no arbiter or enforcer to maintain them.

From the end of World War II until 1989, the international system was bipolar. Any action the United States took was conditioned by the anticipated reaction of the U.S.S.R. But now that the Cold War is over, both domestic and international pressures have been put on the United States government to "wake up" and actively lead the international community. With the absence of any immediate threats to U.S. hegemony, liberalism is in the ascendancy. Realists continue to insist that a state's foreign policy is made with respect to its national security interests and maintain that it is impossible for the United States to remain a unipolar hegemon forever. In this world of anarchy, they believe a balance of power will inevitably emerge, as a rising hegemon (such as Japan or China) steps forward to challenge the United States's position of dominance. (Layne, 1994, p. 248 and Zakaria, *New York Times*, 26 March 1997) Thus, realists argue, for the U.S. to involve itself in costly and "irrelevant" African civil wars will only speed the country's decline (Layne, 1995, p. 95).

But if the pursuit of a state's own national interest is so obviously the best guide to foreign policy making (as realists will tell you), why do American statesmen behave otherwise? It is because international norms (collective expectations for the proper

behavior of actors) have a growing influence in the post-Cold War era. (Katzenstein, 1995a, p. 5) Policy makers do not always follow the systematic pressures inherent in the international system of an anarchical world due to other pressures of norms and culture emanating from the international community and a state's domestic system. (Zakaria, Winter 1992/93, p. 24; Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein, 1995, pp. 45-48)

Over the past five years, numerous general foreign policy surveys have shown "that the American public is increasingly well-informed about global issues, devotes attention to evolving international events, and has opinions on most foreign and defense policy questions." (Kelleher, Spring 1994, p. 27) The Bush and Clinton administrations got involved in these humanitarian missions due to American public opinion driven by the "CNN effect."

> The causal mechanism of the CNN effect is conceived as follows: Television images of atrocities → journalists and opinions leaders criticize government policy in the media (TV, radio, newspapers) → the pressure on the government "to do something" becomes unbearable → the government "does something." (Jakobsen, 1996:33, p. 206)

"The humanitarian disaster in Somalia was on all the television screens in the United States by August 1992. A sense of urgency about Somalia within the United States Congress and public significantly raised the pressures on the U.S. administration." (Clarke, 1997, p. 8) According to an analysis by Peter Jakobsen on the interaction between national interest, humanitarian causes, and CNN:

> Governments will work hard to mobilize support and accept a significant number of casualties when national interest is at stake. Humanitarian interventions, on the contrary, are driven by a combination of the CNN effect and good chances of success as governments are reluctant to take casualties when national interests are not involved. (Jakobsen, 1996:33, p. 205)

Jakobsen's study focused on five post-Cold War United Nations peace enforcement operations to determine why they were initiated: Kuwait, Northern Iraq, Somalia, Rwanda and Haiti. He found that when national interests are not perceived to be in jeopardy, the CNN effect is needed to mobilize pressure on Western governments to act.

> Once the CNN effect has placed a conflict on the agenda, the perceived chances of success become the principal factor determining whether an enforcement operation will take place or not. Since governments are more risk averse in conflicts not involving national interests, and enforcement operation is unlikely to be undertaken unless the risk of casualties can be kept to a minimum and the operation can be limited in time. (Jakobsen, 1996: 33, p. 213)

As articulated in Chapter III, the reason why there is so much violence and instability in sub-Saharan Africa is because African states are weak. African states are experiencing the growing pains of consolidating a central authority, or in Migdal's words, trying to figure out who in society has the right to make the rules for everyone else. As expressed in Chapter II, this state-building activity is a violent and lengthy process. Therefore, as Jakobsen predicted, Western powers are reluctant to intervene.

Essentially, the United States intervenes in the civil wars or internal conflicts of states for two reasons:

- it is in the United States's own security interest (for Africa, this was the containment of communism during the Cold War), or
- a perceived moral "obligation" stemming from public opinion aroused by modern technical advances (i.e., the CNN effect)

As articulated in section A of this chapter, the United States has no real security interests when it comes to sub-Saharan African. Therefore, this leaves the second justification, explained in section B. Either way, U.S. military intervention is not going to strengthen Africa's weak states. When the U.S. acts in its own security interests, it

does so in order to maintain its own place in the world system (i.e., to maintain the current balance of power or current status quo) or to increase its own power. When the U.S. acts in accordance with humanitarian purposes, its goal in intervening is to stop the violence and restore order and stability. The outcome is still the same because the goal of intervention is still the same – restore order and stability. The weak states of sub-Saharan Africa need change. The old strategies of survival need to be broken in order for the strategies of a modern state to take hold. In the next section, I will expand on this issue by showing how the U.S. intervenes in these internal conflicts. Essentially, what the U.S. is willing to do in sub-Saharan Africa has no effect on the structural constraints that are preventing strong states from forming.

C. HOW DOES THE U.S. INTERVENE

In the 1990's, the far-reaching goal of intervention is, of course, to solve the conflict but the immediate goal becomes establishing stability in the region. Additional goals are often added to this, depending on the particular conflict. These range from feeding the victims of famine (Somalia) all the way to creating a democratic regime (Haiti).

Humanitarian intervention, however, "involves political consequences when suffering has political causes." (Mandelbaum, Summer 1994, p. 4) This is particularly true in sub-Saharan Africa, where failed states such as Somalia and Liberia, and states on the verge of collapse such as Zaire and Rwanda, are in dire need of humanitarian assistance.

> The suffering that attracted American humanitarian attention to the horn of Africa was caused by a civil war. Somalia – as well as Cambodia and

> Haiti, where the United Nations has also been involved – is an example of what is being called a "failed state." Humanitarian intervention in such states leads to the task of putting them back together. That in turn requires restoring order, which is a military, or quasi-military, undertaking. It also requires reestablishing functioning institutions of government, which have disintegrated under the pressure of war. Reconstructing a state is a political matter. (Mandelbaum, Summer 1994, p. 11)

This is a very accurate observation. But what does it take to reconstruct a state and why can the United States not do it for Somalia, Liberia, or Zaire? Reconstructing a state entails building a political, economic, and social link between government and society. This is a time-consuming, manpower-intensive, and often violent process. It entails coming up with rules for how society should behave and training and equipping a force that can enforce those rules. It also involves the extraction of resources from society and a plan on how the state can reallocate those resources for its own efficiency and for the benefit of society. But as Migdal pointed out, the major struggle for these new states is figuring out "*who* has the right and ability to make these rules that guide people's social behavior." (Migdal, 1988, p. 31)

Richard K. Betts made a convincing argument that intervening forces cannot be impartial.

> Limited intervention may end a war if the intervenor takes sides, tilts the local balance of power, and helps one of the rivals to win – that is, if it is not impartial. Impartial intervention may end a war if the outsiders take complete command of the situation, overawe all the local competitors, and impose a peace settlement – that is, it is not limited. Trying to have it both ways usually blocks peace by doing enough to keep either belligerent from defeating the other, but not enough to make them stop trying. (Betts, 1994, p. 21)

The reason why the factions are at war in the first place is because they cannot decide who gets to call the shots during peace. Zartman claims that these new states need

foreign military intervention to "protect civilian leaders as they seek to emerge" and to prevent "the warlords from fighting each other." (Zartman, 1995, p. 272) But if that is the case, then the external intervenors (the United States) will again be choosing these states' leaders for them. Also, for how long will the U.S. need to protect the civilian leaders from the military ones? The United States does not have a very good track record of picking another country's leader for it: Mobutu Sese Sekou (Zaire), Ferdinand Marcos (Philippines), and Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlaui (Iran). History has shown that these men are not sterling examples of leadership and have often drained their own countries' wealth for their own personal coffers.

Similarly, Zartman claims that "foreign intervention may be needed to perform the functions of the state under collapse, but only until local forces can take over the business of putting the state back together." (1995, p. 272) When will that be? As chapter II showed, state-building is a very lengthy process having taken Europe almost two centuries! But also as shown in Chapter II, state-making involves a process of military capability driving development. External military intervention is the most powerful form of external patronage a country can receive. One of the warring factions will receive the support of the best military in the world without the economic or political development to sustain its effects once the patron leaves. But even if the desire of the patron to stay in "for the long haul existed," allowing foreign control over state functions for say, 50-75 years, this looks too much like colonialism to be pragmatically feasible; especially when the intervening forces are white Anglo-Saxons and the collapsed states are in black Africa. Obviously, Europeans (and that includes Americans)

did not do a very good job of colonizing Africa in the first place or why would these problems still be occurring? What makes us think we can do a better job now?

Additionally, there is a limit to the cost the American public is willing to pay to enforce its norms on the rest of the world. These costs are reflected not only in terms of money, but also in time and manpower. When humanitarian intervention is clearly linked to furthering United States security interests, Americans are sometimes willing to make a greater sacrifice to meet their objectives. According to a March 1996 RAND Research Brief, a large proportion of the American people perceived that the United States's interests and principles were at stake in, for example, WWII and the invasion of Panama in 1989. However, Americans are less willing to tolerate casualties where U.S. interests and principles are unclear and a successful outcome is doubtful (i.e., Dominican intervention in 1965, Vietnam, and Somalia in 1992).[4] But when there are no vital interests at stake, such as in Africa, as described in the first half of this chapter, American intervention could be described as a "one night stand." This means that the United States perceives a successful intervention when no security interests are at stake as one that is

- cheap (Schraeder, 1992, p. 394)
- quick (Clarke and Herbst, March/April 1996, p. 82)
- involves few/no casualties (Kelleher, Spring 1994, p. 29)

But when it comes to the failed states of Africa, there is no quick or cheap fix. African countries plagued by these civil wars need to have their states rebuilt. This is a long, expensive, and often repressive task that involves disarmament, demobilization,

[4] RAND Research Brief, "Public Support for U.S. Military Operations," March 1996, accessed via the Internet at http://www.rand.org/publications/RB/RB2502/RB2502.html on 27 Aug 1996.

reconstruction, rebuilding a justice system, and developing confidence-building mechanisms between the warring factions. With respect to the structural constraints to state formation in Africa, *if* the U.S. had vital interests in the region, it *could* break some of those pre-colonial structures. (I am referring specifically to changes in land tenure.) This is because the United States *might* be willing to sacrifice the necessary time, manpower, and casualties necessary to implement such a violent policy. As Migdal points out, the European colonizers did this for most of the Third World except Africa. (Migdal, 1988, p. 57) But even if the United States broke these pre-colonial structures for them, the responsibility of building the state structures would be still on the shoulders of African leaders. If not, the cycle of American politicians choosing African heads of state would start all over again.

When it comes to African countries, it is hardly foreseeable that the United States will involve itself in any peacekeeping operations, never mind state-building. The United States's "quick-and-cheap-fix" success criteria for a military intervention is not conducive to the expensive, time-consuming effort needed to break the structural constraints to state formation in Africa. Nevertheless, influential policy makers and opinion leaders[5] still believe, despite the numerous failures of the past seven years, that the international community can "do something."

State-building is an internal process. Not only is the United States not willing to "help" with this process for any other country, but it cannot. Modern states form from

[5] On 11 Nov 97, I attended a roundtable discussion at Stanford University pertaining to how peace accords can be sustained in today's civil wars. Some participants, such as Ambassador Alvarado De Soto, the United Nations Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs, and Dame Margaret Anstee, former Undersecretary General for the United Nations, still insist that external intervention is needed to solve these civil wars.

the feedback process of a growing state's military capability and economic and political development, as discussed in Chapter II. When the United States intervenes militarily, it prevents these states from developing the domestic economic and political basis for modern states. Somalia was a reminder of the limits of American military forces when it comes to meeting the needs of foreign civil wars and the demands of its domestic patrons. In the next chapter, I will elaborate further on the foreign military intervention in Somalia showing why the international community's efforts to build the state in Somalia were unsuccessful.

V. SOMALIA – THE BENCHMARK OF FUTURE PEACE OPERATIONS

Somalia may go down in history as the debacle of the international community in the 1990s. This was the first opportunity following the end of the Cold War for the international community to come together and enforce the norms it espoused to uphold when the United Nations was formed in the 1940s. There was no ideological obstacle to hurdle, no real conflict of interest to overcome, just pure and simple humanitarian assistance to a starving country of six million people. Well, at least that is what the American public perceived to be the mission (Lyons and Samatar, 1995, p. 59).

The causes of the Somali conflict are much deeper than famine and, consequently, their solutions require much more than food aid. This chapter will analyze the civil war in Somalia, which "officially" began in January 1991, when the state collapsed, and continues on today. First, its root causes will be identified. Second, the intervention itself will be analyzed in terms of the United States military intervention, as well as the diplomatic initiatives taken to resolve the conflict. Finally, the results of these efforts will be analyzed in terms of both the effect it had on the international community and on Somalia.

A. ROOT CAUSES

There are three root causes to the collapse of the Somali state:

- the clash of pre-colonial social and political institutions that still existed in Somali society and the capitalist and centralized political system superimposed by the European colonizers,
- neopatrimonialism, and
- external patronage.

The most evident cause of the destruction of state and society in Somalia can be found in the neopatrimonial ruler, Mohammed Siad Barre. However, before the finger can be

pointed at him, an explanation of traditional Somali culture is needed. There still exist pre-colonial social and political institutions which are incompatible with a modern state. The instigation of a commodity-ordered social system imported by the British and Italian colonizers with its Weberian emphasis on individualism and private welfare, coupled with rapidly decreasing resources, "eroded the old linkages between blood ties and the pan-Somali code of conduct (known as the *heer*), as well as Islamic precepts. As individuals struggled to secure a foothold in a precarious new world, heer was shed like an old skin or else was mutilated in a desperate attempt to fit it into new and chaotic circumstances," (Lyons and Samatar, 1995, p. 63). As the theory in chapter II showed, this process of breaking the old and replacing with new institutions is very violent, but inevitable if a modern state is to form.

1. Clash of Civilizations

Prior to colonization, the Somali were a relatively homogenous ethnic group[1] traversing not only present day Somalia (and Somaliland) but also the northwestern part of Kenya, part of Djibouti, and a large chunk of Ethiopia known as the Ogaden. It was a predominantly pastoral, subsistence, and decentralized society. In the harsh environment of the Horn of Africa, an individual's kinship (blood-ties and *heer*) were the central elements to his survival. Blood-ties represented genealogical connections with patrilineal roots of common ancestry. Somalis have three major clan

[1] Unlike the rest of sub-Saharan Africa but similar to Europe and the Middle East, the fact that Somalia is already culturally homogeneous helps reduce some of the violence (in theory) because common bonds of language, religion, and laws are already established. The Holy Roman Empire helped do this for Europe just as the Ottoman Empire did for the Middle East. Nevertheless, state-building – the formation of institutions of power that efficiently and impersonally regulate behavior, economic relations, and protection – still needed to be completed.

families with numerous sub families and lineage segments (see Fig 5.1). Clans were geographically dispersed and not necessarily contiguous (see Fig 3.2 on p. 50). "Clan solidarity was maintained in part by the institution of 'blood-payments,' the *diya*, whereby the lineage had collective obligations to honor certain debts and make restitution for wrongs. The clan structure was further reinforced by communal access to the range and family ownership of the herd, the principal economic asset," (Lyons and Samatar, 1995, pp. 9-10).

The *heer* was an unwritten set of rules and norms generally accepted as a pan-Somali code of conduct. Emphasizing interdependence and inclusiveness, "the *heer* was a social contract democratically constructed (all adult males took part in it) to check the occasional conflicts between individuals and among communities. What gave the *heer* staying power in the absence of centralized coercive machinery was its voluntarism associated with the absolute necessity of relying and living on one's labor/livestock rather than exploiting others," (Samatar, 1992, pp. 630-631).

The embrace of Islam in the eighth century reinforced these two elements of pre-colonial Somali society. This symbiosis prevented and restrained centrifugal tendencies in the lineage system, inhibiting greedy and power-hungry men from dragging the community into the hell that it is now (Samatar, 1992, p. 631). This lifestyle, though harsh and primitive by Western standards provided a safe existence for the Somali. It was the commercialization of their primary economic means, livestock, and the "imposition of a colonial state on a decentralized social structure, and the creation of post-pastoral democratic nodes of power" that began the deterioration of Somali society (Samatar, 1992, p. 631).



Fig 5.1. Somali Clan Lineage
(Lyons and Samatar, 1995, p. 9)

The British occupied the port of Aden in Yemen beginning in 1839. London soon became aware of the abundance of meat supplies in northern Somalia, on the other side of the Gulf of Aden. "By 1866, the British had signed formal agreements with representatives of some major kin groups to officially turn northern Somalia (Somaliland) into a protectorate." (Lyons and Samatar, 1995, p. 11) Italy, joining the African scramble late, established their colony in southern Somalia in 1890, "imposed a more direct administration, and eventually introduced the most brutal facets of fascism." (Lyons and Samatar, 1995, p. 11)

The intrusion of the powerful forces of the international market and the imposition of a centralized hierarchical governing structure corroded the traditional Somali order. The imperialists commercialized (but did not modernize) the pastoral and agricultural mode of living of almost all of Somalia. No new methods of production or livelihood were substituted. What rose instead were "small but rapidly growing social groups involved in trading, as well as state employees, who came to demand independence in 1950." (Samatar, 1992, p. 633) On 1 July 1960, the British and Italian colonies united to form Somalia. This new leadership with little first-hand knowledge or linkage to the traditional way of life, lacked the vision and capacity to implement a development strategy for Somalia's weak economy. (Samatar, 1992, p. 633)

Control of the state soon became a coveted prize due to the influx of foreign aid intended to support development plans. Seeing the state as the quickest way to get rich, political parties mushroomed and then immediately disappeared after the election. In the first post-independence national election in 1964, eighteen parties participated but only three had any national standing. By 1969, sixty parties emerged supporting 1,000

candidates to compete for 122 seats. To rally support, candidates and parties had to rely on their clans and subclans. (Lyons and Samatar, 1995, p. 13) This large number of political parties, with no ideology as a base, shows just how socially fragmented Somalia was at that time.

On 15 Oct 1969, President Abdirashid was assassinated by a member of his own police force. Six days later, Gen Siad Barre led a bloodless coup, welcomed by Somali society as their liberators because the Abdirashid regime did nothing but haggle over who received what campaign expenses. No attention was paid to the demand of society. Little did the Somali realize their problems were just beginning (Lyons and Samatar, 1995, p. 14).

2. Siad Barre

At independence, Somalia's flag consisting of five stars symbolized the dream of uniting all Somalis in the region. The Italian and British colonies already united at independence. The other three, as previously mentioned, included the Ogaden region in Ethiopia, the north eastern section of Kenya, and a portion of Djibouti. Soon after Gen. Siad Barre took power he attempted to unite and erase the clan divisions by adopting "scientific socialism." Tribalism (clan based identities) was officially banned since it epitomized nepotism and corruption (Lyons and Samatar, 1995, p. 14).

Siad Barre's downfall began in 1978, when Somalia lost its war with Ethiopia over the Ogaden region. The reunification of Somalia was the driving force binding Somali society since independence. This defeat led to an increase of "clan antagonisms as each group sought scapegoats to explain the failure. That, in turn, led to an abortive coup in April 1978, and some of the officers involved, mainly from the Majerteen clan

(the only clan from the Darod family that Siad Barre had excluded from central power) subsequently formed the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) which ironically was given sanctuary in Ethiopia. By seeking asylum in Ethiopia, the Majerteen officers signaled the disintegration of Somali unity." (Makinda, 1992, p. 27)

"Tribalistic behavior became a serious criminal offense. The collective payment of blood money was correspondingly outlawed and marriage officially emptied of its corporate lineage significance." (Lewis, 1991, p. 89) In further efforts to modernize and unite the Somali clans, Siad Barre adopted a Roman script for the national language and introduced in 1973 an intensive nationwide urban and rural literacy campaign.

Although these measures to build national solidarity and eliminate clan divisions appear to be conducive to state-building, they were actually accompanied by Siad Barre's reinforcement of kinship in assigning important state positions. His trusted ministers were from his own clan, the Marehan. Two other trusted clans included that of his mother, the Ogdeni, and that of his son-in law, Dolbahante. Consequently, Siad Barre's government was known as the MOD. (Makinda, 1992, p. 26)

In April 1978, shortly after the Ogaden war, a poorly organized coup led by Majerteen colonels failed. "In a pattern that would be repeated against other opponents, the regime launched vicious communal reprisals against the Majerteen clan. Civilians were targeted, and communal economic structures such as water wells and livestock were destroyed. Militias from rival clans received arms and were encouraged to seize Majerteen property." (Lyons and Samatar, 1995, p. 17) Spurred by Siad Barre, many Ogadeni moved into Isaq land in the north igniting intense clan antagonisms. After further repression and economic and political marginalization, elites from the northern

Isaq clan formed the Somali National Movement (SNM) in 1981 with the goal of overthrowing Siad Barre (Lyons and Samatar, 1995, p. 17).

> The patronage, on one hand, and repression on the other to maintain authority became increasingly clear in the 1980s. As Siad Barre's power eroded, his reliance on arbitrary force grew until by the 1980s he relied upon little but terror and manipulations of clan identities to remain in power. (Lyons and Samatar, 1995, p. 15)

By 1988, Somalia was embroiled in civil war. "Guerrilla activity had become the only effective way of making the government accountable." (Lyons and Samatar, 1995, p. 30) Various anti-Siad Barre clan-based rebel groups began to spring up. The Isaq dominated SNM, the Hawiye-based USC, and the Ogadeni-based SPM. By August 1990, these three factions agreed to coordinate their efforts.

The Somali government officially collapsed on 23 January 1991, when the SPM under Col. Ahmed Umar Jess forced Siad Barre out of a bunker where he was hiding near the airport. In the ensuing power vacuum characteristic of collapsed states, Ali Mahdi Mohamed, the leader of a USC faction and member of the Abgal subclan, proclaimed himself president. His rival within the USC, Gen Mohamed Farah Aideed, a member of the Habr Gedir clan, rejected Mahdi's leadership. In actuality, the Hawiye-clan (both the Abgal and Habr Gedir are Hawiye subclans) played "virtually no role in the anti-Siad Barre struggle until a few months before his fall." (Makinda, 1992, p. 31)

3. External Patronage

Throughout the duration of Siad Barre's regime, Somalia always received extensive amounts of external patronage, either from the Soviets or the United States. Somalia's strategic location at the tip of the Horn of Africa, "guarding" the rich wealth of the Middle East, made it an ideal ally during the Cold War – that is, an ally to the

Soviets.[2] Somalia rejected early offers of Western assistance because it was insufficient to carry out its goal of unification. Apparently, facing its own population to raise the funds necessary for this was not on the agenda. The Soviets offered Somalia a military assistance package they could not refuse. By 1970, Somalia had proportionally the largest army in Africa with 9.74 military personnel per 1,000 civilians, as well as the most heavily equipped with over 200 tanks in 1972. (Mullins, 1987, p. 26) This external patronage, whether in the form of development assistance or military weaponry may seem like a "helping hand" at first glance but in actuality, as described earlier,[3] external patronage is the biggest factor in keeping Third World states weak.

Recalling Mullins's feedback model of military capability and development,[4] the mutually beneficial (yet violent) relationship of extraction and protection between state and society that characterized Western Europe in the 18th century was non-existent in post-colonial Somalia. The expansion of Western Europe's military depended on capital accumulation. "The sheer pressure of central government taxation did as much as any economic force to channel peasant production into the market and thereby augment the opportunities for trade creation and economic specialization." (Tilly, 1985, p. 179)

But as articulated throughout Chapter II, extraction (i.e., taxation) is a very unpopular and violent enterprise. Leaders of new states do not need to pursue this unpleasant process to the degree experienced by 18th century Europe because they can turn to a patron – the U.S., the U.S.S.R., France, etc. ... As Mullins clearly showed in the

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[2] The U.S. already had a foothold in Ethiopia and in the tit-for-tat East-West relationship which was consistent throughout the Cold War years in Africa, the Soviets sided with Somalia.
[3] See Chapter III, p. 63.
[4] See Chapter II, pp. 26-27.

case of Somalia, "elites virtually ignored a development agenda, and [its] economy suffered accordingly, but military growth continued unabated." (Mullins, 1987, p. 108) This point is graphically shown in Fig 5.2 in which the GNP (in billions of dollars) vs. military capability[5] of Somalia from 1960 to 1980 shows a rather weak slope.[6] Although Somalia is at the extreme as a recipient of excessive amounts of military capability, the point is that "external patronage fundamentally alters the pressures to push development." (Mullins, 1987, p. 111) And without development, modern states cannot emerge.



Fig 5.2. GNP in billions of dollars and military capability for Somalia, 1960 to 1980. (Mullins, 1987, p. 94)

[5] For the military capability score, Mullins needed "a comparative scale that would measure how much attention, in both a quantitative and qualitative sense, states would pay for the acquisition of military power." (1987, p. 40) He therefore constructed an index, using the Conjoint Measurement III algorithm, which could transform annual national data on military personnel and thirteen categories of weapons stocks into a single annual military capability score which also took into account both quantitative and qualitative components of capability (Mullins, 1987, p. 59). For a more in depth explanation of this method, please see especially chapters 3 and 4 of A.F. Mullins Born Arming: Development and Military Power in New States, 1987.

[6] At the far right end of the curve, the military capability score reverses itself at the same GNP level. This is because in the late 1970s, Somalia not only lost its Soviet patron (who switched to Somalia's rival, Ethiopia) but also because Somalia lost equipment in combat with Ethiopia over the Ogaden region in 1977-79 which was never replaced. Mullins gives no explanation for the loop at the lower end of the slope and since his book does not provide raw data on specific countries, I cannot make an analysis or project any explanations. Regardless, the point still remains that Somalia was able to acquire massive amounts of military capability through patron aid and not through the development of its own economy, as did Western European states of the 17th and 18th centuries (Mullins, 1987, pp. 94-95).

Not only did external patronage inhibit internal development in Somalia, it also played a key role in prolonging the life of Siad Barre's regime. After he was dropped from the Soviets' payroll, the United States assumed the role of patron but sent mostly defensive arms and $100 million in economic aid per year from 1980 to 1988. As long as the money kept flowing, Siad Barre was able to accommodate (i.e., pay for the loyalty of) his M.O.D. regime while at the same time jailing or exiling abroad elite members of other clans. Not long after the United States cut off its aid in 1988, Siad Barre resorted to sheer oppression and terror in order to maintain control by pitting one clan against the other. "In Somalia, an abrupt stoppage of all aid followed a history of too much aid." (Adam, 1995, p. 75)

4. Summary

It can arguably be said that the cut off of aid by the United States helped push Somalia over the edge of state collapse. However, the collapse of Somalia can be seen as a good thing. There were still two main constraints to state formation in the early 1990s and until they are destroyed, they will continue to prevent a modern state from emerging. First, remnants of pre-colonial political and social institutions persist in Somalia today. The old system of social control was not disrupted sufficiently in order for a new system to emerge. These kinship ties must be replaced by institutions based on impersonal decision-making and implementation so that an efficient political and economic system can take root. Additionally, Siad Barre's neopatrimonial regime is a classic example of politics of survival as expressed by Migdal's theory in Chapter II. Siad Barre was able to accommodate strongmen into his M.O.D. government, or they were eliminated. Old systems of social control were reinforced in the M.O.D. regime at the same time Siad

Barre encouraged clan warfare through divide-and-rule tactics, "throwing state institutions into gridlock, jealousy, confusion, and anarchy." (Adam, 1995, p. 72)

Second, Somalia was probably the biggest client of external patronage of all independent sub-Saharan African states. With the end of the Cold War and the drastic cut Western countries were making in its foreign aid, Somalia really did not have any other option but to collapse. In the long run this was probably the best thing because it gave Somali civil society the breathing room the strengthen itself. The growing private sector and an emerging free press are aspects of a civil society that shed its old skin and is growing a new one. Somaliland stands as a testament to the eventual positive results that can occur after a state collapses if the roots of civil society are allowed to take hold without any political "help" from the international community. (Adam, 1995, pp. 80, 88)

B. MILITARY INTERVENTION

Numerous books and articles have been written over the past four years regarding the United Nations and United States military intervention in Somalia. Therefore, I will not rehash all the details of those operations here. Rather, I will show instances of how the violence in Somalia and the actions of the strongmen are typical of any entity trying to establish centralized authority (as discussed in Chapter II). Second, I will give instances where the United Nations or United States either through military force or diplomatic initiative stood in the way of Somalia factions attempting to centralize power.

1. Violence, Strongmen, and the Power Struggle

The international community finally became intimately involved with the internal affairs of Somalia in the summer of 1992. Although Siad Barre was ousted from power in January 1991, Aideed and Mahdi conducted their power struggle with intermittent

intervals of peace and violence for over a year. The event that triggered U.N. action was the intense six-week battle for control of Mogadishu that started on 17 November 1991 (Drysdale, 1997, p. 119).

The newly-appointed U.N. Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali (BBG) invited both Mahdi and Aideed to New York in January 1992. They agreed to a cease-fire. Only Mahdi agreed to the deployment of foreign troops to Mogadishu. Diplomacy was needed. The Security Council passed Resolution 751 on 22 April 1992, which established the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). Under the direction of Ambassador Mohamad Sahnoun, UNOSOM's mandate:

- called for the immediate deployment of 50 U.N. observers to monitor the cease fire in Mogadishu, and
- proposed the deployment of a UN security force in consultation with parties in Mogadishu. (Drysdale, 1997, p. 121)

Although Mahdi agreed to this intervention, Aideed did not. He saw these actions as the U.N. legitimization of Mahdi's presidency. Hence, Aideed was rarely cooperative in negotiations. This is a clear cut example of what Migdal means when he writes that "the major struggles in many societies, especially those with fairly new states, are over who has the right and ability to make the countless rules that guide people's social behavior." (Migdal, 1988, p. 31) Just as the centralizing actions of the French monarchy of the 17th century provoked a violent reaction from the nobility and that of the English Crown from the gentry and Parliament, the exact same struggle for central authority is unleashing the same violence against the governments in new states (Cohen, Brown, and Organski, 1981: 75, p. 93).

Aideed was paranoid that the U.N., through military intervention, was trying to establish a trusteeship over Somalia. Aideed perceived this as a strengthening of Mahdi's political power. In retrospect, it is therefore easy to see how Aideed would see this as the West setting up its own puppet regime again; picking and choosing whoever was the most cooperative and amenable to Western interests in the region and not a leader who necessarily holds empirical legitimacy.[7] Aideed therefore resisted any attempts at expanding U.N. peacekeeping operations.

2. I'm from Washington and I'm here to help....

On 25 November 1992, the U.S. made the offer to the U.N. to lead a limited enforcement operation (under Security Council authority) in the famine stricken area of the interriverine areas of southern Somalia. Why all of a sudden, after Somalia had been in a state of anarchy for almost two years, did the United States government decide to do something about it? The major factor that drove the U.S. into action was a perceived moral "obligation" (sympathy) stemming from public opinion aroused by modern technical advances – the CNN effect. (Jakobsen, 1996: 33, p. 206)

> The Bush Administration did not perceive any economic and strategic interests in intervening.... [T]he CNN effect put intervention on the agenda. The crisis had enjoyed media attention since July, and the pressure on the United States to do something grew after the presidential election was over in November. Former White House Press Secretary Fitzwater said, "After the election, the media had free time and that was when the pressure started building up. We heard it from every corner, that something must be done. Finally the pressure was too great. The President said, 'I just can't live with this for two months.' (Jakobsen, 1996:33, p. 209)

[7] But then again, had Aideed been the "chosen one," he probably would have accepted the role as the puppet.

Therefore, on 3 December 1992, Resolution 794 was passed authorizing "all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia." (Drysdale, 1997, p. 127)

For the most part, Aideed reacted favorably to the U.S.-led operations because he felt "the Americans would not change the political balance of power to his detriment." (Drysdale, 1997, p. 129) But that sentiment changed six days before UNITAF was scheduled to end. Aideed was informed that Siad Barre's son-in-law, General Mohamed Said "Morgan," and his regime, in exile in Kenya, was about to launch a strike on Kismayu. Aideed requested that the U.S. troops repulse Morgan's troops before it attacked Kismayu. Aideed claimed that Oakley agreed to this request but then retracted on this commitment the next day with no explanation. Apparently, this would have been a breach of their mandate; the use of force was only to be exercised for protection of humanitarian relief operations. Morgan ended up reoccupying Kismayu. Shooting took place a few days later, presumably by Muslim fundamentalist trying to embarrass Aideed. "Oakley, concerned about Aideed's condemnation of UNITAF, issued an ultimatum giving Morgan 48 hours to remove his militia from Kismayu." (Drysdale, 1997, p. 131) Aideed received unconfirmed intelligence that this was an empty threat and refused to talk with Johnston or Oakley. After months of delay, U.S. troops under UNITAF finally pulled out in May 1993, (Drysdale, 1997, pp. 130-131).

Stephen Stedman wrote in 1995 that once soldiers are used to feed and protect civilians, a political stigma is immediately put on the actual humanitarian mission (1995, pp. 48-49, 51). United States forces were in Somalia to set up a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations. They were to remain impartial. This was obviously

impossible. One minute Oakley was telling Aideed he could not fire on Morgan's troops and the next minute Oakley was issuing Morgan an ultimatum. The military, no matter what Samaritan causes it wishes to fulfill, cannot be decoupled from politics. This fact was clearly articulated as far back as the early 1800s by the military strategist Carl von Clausewitz in his book On War. "War is an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will." (Clausewitz, 1976, p. 75) The United States may not have officially classified its intentions in Somalia as "war" due to the domestic and international stigma which that particular word carries; nonetheless, the mere presence of U.S. armed forces in Somalia proved that the U.S. was prepared to impose its will on another actor, hence the possibility of war. Additionally, Clausewitz observed that the motive for war (no matter how limited) stems from a political objective (Clausewitz, 1976, p. 81).

> War is merely the continuation of policy by other means.... All wars can be considered acts of policy.... The political objective is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose. (Clausewitz, 1976, p. 87, 88)

According to Article I, section 8, of the U.S. Constitution, only Congress shall have the power to declare war. However, the precedent was set by Truman via the Korean conflict for a modification of that procedure. Since then, "the congressional power to declare war became equated with the power to declare total war. The commitment of forces to do something less than total war was, in practice, done under the authority of the President, who acted with such consultation with Congress as he deemed appropriate." (Huntington, 1982, p. 744)

The point is, the purpose for which states use military force has not changed in over 200 years. No matter how one wants to justify it, military force is used when the

United States wishes to impose its will – its policies – on a recalcitrant actor. The military is used when other less coercive means, such as diplomacy, fail to meet with compliance.

Recognizing that humanitarian missions cannot be decoupled from the traditional policy-imposing objectives that militaries are intended to fulfill, the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II resulted in an expansion of the U.N. mandate. A peace conference which ended on 26 March 1993, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, with an embrace between Mahdi and Aideed and the adoption of Resolution 814 which widened the peace-enforcement powers of the U.N. intervention force "from the protection of humanitarian relief supplies to consolidation, expansion, and maintenance of a secure environment throughout Somalia." (Drysdale, 1997, p. 131)

But the relationship between Aideed and the UN soured again a month later in May 1993 when Aideed and Col. Abdillahi Yusuf Ahmed of the SSDF (a northeastern political front) met in Mogadishu to resolve ancient grazing and watering disputes between the two subclans. This was known as the Mugud talks. The U.N. felt Aideed was ignoring UNOSOM's mandate by excluding from his conference other faction leaders. "The proposed conference gave vent to a severe confrontation between UNOSOM II and Aideed, deepening his conviction that the U.N. was bent on marginalizing him politically in favor of promoting the interests of Mahdi and his allies." (Drysdale, 1997, pp. 131-132).

Tension between Aideed and UNOSOM culminated on 5 June 1993. Pakistani troops were inspecting a heavy weapons repository that shared the same compound as Aideed's radio station. When Pakistani soldiers entered the radio station, as authorized under Resolution 814, the crowd was furious. "Later that day, militia loyal to Aideed

killed 24 virtually defenseless Pakistani peacemakers guarding an outside soup kitchen." (Drysdale, 1997, p. 132)

This act incited a knee jerk reaction from the Security Council which immediately adopted Resolution 837, which authorizes the member state to "take all necessary measures against all those responsible for the armed attacks... to establish the effective authority of UNOSOM II throughout Somalia, including to secure the investigation of their actions and their arrest and detention for prosecution, trial and punishment." (Drysdale, 1997, p. 132)

This began the manhunt for Aideed. Four months later, 18 U.S. Rangers died in an unsuccessful attempt to capture Aideed. Since that moment, U.S. participation in U.N. peacekeeping (or peacemaking or peace-enforcement) missions has been minimal at best. The last American forces in Somalia left on 26 March 1994.

3. State-Building and Military Intervention

The main strongmen in Somalia at this time were Mahdi, Aideed, and remnants of Siad Barre's old regime led by Morgan. Throughout the duration of international community's involvement in Somalia, Aideed remained paranoid that the U.N. or the U.S. was going to tip the balance of power to his detriment. He was probably right. Military intervention is the worst type of external patronage a great power can give a weak Third World state. Aideed needed that "law of the jungle" to establish his control. The international community, in attempting to promote peace, order, and stability, was not willing to allow Aideed that same freedom their countries enjoyed when they were forming into national states.

C. LESSONS LEARNED FROM SOMALIA

The last elements of UNOSOM II left Mogadishu in March 1995. Somalia was glad to see them go. After almost three years of military intervention and $2 billion, virtually nothing was accomplished. Now, six years since Siad Barre was ousted from power, Somalia is still engaged in clan warfare and is still classified as a collapsed state.

Numerous articles and books have been written these past four years regarding what went wrong in Somalia, suggesting various tactics the United States and United Nations should do next time, such as using preventive diplomacy, negotiating with all the factions, disarming all factions, or just going in and taking a side in order to preserve international stability.

I feel the most valuable lesson the world learned regarding military intervention is that it cannot be impartial and limited at the same time. Richard K. Betts claims that "War will not end until both sides agree who will control whatever is in dispute." (Betts, Nov/Dec 1994, p. 21)

> If outsiders such as the United States or the United Nations are faced with demands for peace in wars where passions have not burned out, they can avoid the costs and risks that go with entanglement by refusing the mandate – staying aloof and letting the locals fight it out. Or they can jump in and help one of the contenders defeat the other. (Betts, Nov/Dec 1994, p. 28)

Essentially, Betts is saying the international community needs to make a choice – either stay out or go in with guns blazing. Throughout the twentieth century, the United States and the United Nations have done both. Usually however, the United States has militarily intervened when it perceived its strategic interests to be at stake. Whether or not the United States (or United Nations) has a strategic interest in a particular country is irrelevant to the fact that intervention will prevent that weak Third World state from

becoming strong. But in these instances, it does not matter to the United States if intervention is preventing it from becoming strong because the United States will do whatever it takes to remain on top. Therefore, there may be some countries (such as those in the Middle East) which are destined to remain weak because the United States has too great of an interest in that region to allow another great power to emerge (Lustick, 1995, p. 4).

The point I have been trying to support throughout this thesis is that military intervention prevents weak Third World states from becoming strong. Military intervention, the most powerful form of external patronage, not only prevents the strongest in the race for "the survival of the fittest" from fairly (internal legitimacy) wining or losing, it also prevents weak Third World states from developing. It is almost like keeping them on a worldwide welfare system. Intervention is futile because "the failure of some states represents a natural process that should be allowed to run its course. The vast majority of state-formation attempts in Europe, for example, failed or involved considerable bloodshed over several centuries. There is no reason to believe that states created in the wake of colonization and decolonization will do better," (Weiss, 1997, p. 210).

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